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VICARIOUS AGGRAVATORS
Sam Kamin∗ & Justin Marceau∗∗
Abstract
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty was
constitutional so long as it provided a non-arbitrary statutory mechanism
for determining who are the worst of the worst, and therefore, deserving of
the death penalty. As a general matter, this process of narrowing the class
of death eligible offenders is done through the codification of aggravating
factors. If the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more
aggravating factors exists, then a defendant convicted of murder is eligible
for the ultimate sentence. There is, however, a critical, unanswered, and
under-theorized issue raised by the use of aggravating factors to serve this
constitutionally mandated filtering function. Can death eligibility be
predicated on vicarious aggravating factor liability—is there vicarious
death penalty liability?
A pair of cases, collectively known as the Supreme Court’s
Enmund/Tison doctrine, recognize that there is no per se bar on the
imposition of the death penalty for non-killing accomplices. But these
cases considered only felony murder liability and did not address the
question of whether a non-killer can be rendered death eligible on the basis
of vicariously imposed aggravating factors. Presently, many state statutes
allow aggravating factors to be proven vicariously (or are silent on the
question); under such a rule, the existence or absence of one or more
aggravating factors will often bear little relation to the defendant’s
individual culpability. Because a defendant can be made eligible for capital
murder through his participation in the crime with others—he is liable for
murder as an accomplice, under a theory of co-conspirator or Pinkerton
liability, or felony murder—in many cases we can have little confidence
that a statute’s aggravating factors are serving their constitutional function
of rationally determining who will live and who will die. This article is the
first to identify this constitutional problem and to provide a framework for
resolving it. After parsing a variety of capital sentencing statutes we
propose a framework for determining the legislative intent behind an
aggravating factor and for ensuring a sufficient level of culpability before a
non-killing defendant may be sentenced to death.
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sentencer’s discretion.1 Consequently, in every death-penalty jurisdiction in
the United States,2 the sentencer’s discretion to impose the ultimate
punishment is limited by a requirement that a jury determine whether
certain eligibility factors are present before a death sentence can be
imposed. As a general rule, this process of guiding jury discretion is
achieved through the use of statutorily enumerated aggravating factors.3
Aggravating factors, then, serve the constitutionally mandated goal of
separating the worst of the worst (those eligible for death) from the merely
very bad. Aggravating factors do this by creating categories of crimes and
killers that are inherently worse—and therefore more deserving of society’s
condemnation—than others.
There is, however, a critical, unanswered, and under-theorized issue
raised by the use of aggravating factors to serve this constitutionally
1. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
189 (1976)) (“A fair statement of the consensus expressed by the Court in Furman is that ‘where
discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a
human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.’”). There is a robust academic literature
documenting and examining the requirement of guided discretion in the context of capital
sentencing. See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the Eighth
Amendment, and Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 179 nn.88–89 (2009) (compiling
academic and judicial support for the requirement, more generally, of heightened procedural
protections in death penalty cases); Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for
Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1980); Scott E. Sundby,
The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital
Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1148 (1991) (“The first commandment of ‘guided discretion’
requires that the sentencer’s discretion be narrowly guided as to which circumstances subject a
defendant to the imposition of the death penalty.”).
2. Currently, thirty-six states and the federal government permit the imposition of a death
sentence. See Death Penalty Facts, AMNESTY INT'L USA 1 (May 2012), http://www.amnestyusa.org/
pdfs/DeathPenaltyFactsMay2012.pdf.
3. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(F) (2012); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-4-604 (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 181.3-1201(5) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(i) (West Supp. 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 4209(e) (2007); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (2012);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9) (2012); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b) (West Supp. 2012);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b) (LexisNexis 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6624 (2011); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a) (West 2012); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(A) (Supp. 2012);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(g)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-19101(5) (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032(2) (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303 (2011); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033 (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VII) (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5 (LexisNexis 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-2000(e) (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A) (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21
§ 701.12 (Supp. 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b) (2011); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)
(West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a) (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1 (2012);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i) (2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (West 2011); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-202(1)–(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (2012); WASH.
REV. CODE § 10.95.020 (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h) (2011).
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mandated function. Because many state statutes allow aggravating factors
to be proven vicariously4 (or are silent on the question), it is possible that
the existence or absence of one or more aggravating factors will bear little
relation to the defendant’s actual culpability. Where a defendant is made
eligible for capital murder because of his participation in a crime with
others—where he is liable for murder as an accomplice; under a theory of
coconspirator, Pinkerton liability; or felony murder—we can have little
confidence that a statute’s aggravating factors are rationally determining
who is most culpable, and therefore, who will live and who will die.
“Vicarious liability” has long been controversial in the criminal law
generally.5 A foundational concern goes to the propriety of holding one
person criminally accountable for the actions of another.6 In the deathpenalty context, a further concern arises regarding the fact that non-killers,
even those who never intended that a death occur, may constitutionally be
put to death because of the actions of others.7 We are concerned here,
however, with a third level of attenuation between culpability and
punishment—that is, we note the additional problems caused when a
defendant can be made eligible for the death penalty based on
characteristics that may have little or nothing to do with either his acts or
his mental state. Stated another way, this Article illustrates the problems
inherent in a three-tiered system of vicarious death-penalty eligibility:
(1) imputing criminal liability to a defendant for acts of another (under
vicarious liability theories); (2) establishing a non-killer’s sufficient
culpability for the death penalty (under the Supreme Court’s Enmund–
Tison doctrine8); and (3) imputing the existence of a death-qualifying
4. This Article uses the term vicarious liability in a slightly casual way. In reality,
coconspirator liability and felony murder are theories of vicarious liability—the defendant is strictly
liable for the actions of others because he has voluntarily associated himself with them. By contrast,
accomplice or aiding-and-abetting liability is a theory of derivative liability—because the
accomplice has encouraged the criminal misconduct, his liability derives from the principals. This
Article uses the term vicarious liability throughout to refer to all situations where one defendant is
made liable for the conduct of another.
5. See, e.g., Audrey Rogers, Accomplice Liability for Unintentional Crimes: Remaining
Within the Constraints of Intent, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1351, 1360 n.30 (1998) (acknowledging the
controversy that “swirls around” complicity and conspiracy liability for the unintended crimes of
the principal); Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability:
New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 110 n.107 (1985) (“Especially in cases of
conspiracy, the result can be ‘vicarious criminal responsibility as broad as, or broader than, the
vicarious civil liability . . . .’”); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It
Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1482 n.26 (1996) (describing vicarious criminal liability as
“controversial and unpopular”).
6. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser
Offense?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 427, 433 (2008) (summarizing the “troubling features of derivative
liability”).
7. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797
(1982).
8. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 156–58; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798, 801.
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aggravating factor (as required by Furman9) under a theory of vicarious
liability.
Previous scholarship and judicial decisions have generally been silent
on the question of vicarious aggravating-factor liability.10 Perhaps this is
due to some prosecutors’ reluctance to seek the death penalty when they
can only prove an aggravating factor through a theory of vicarious liability.
However, it is certainly not the case that prosecutors never seek sentences
of death on the basis of vicarious-aggravator liability. Many cases in which
the death penalty is sought against a non-killer will involve vicarious
liability.11 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s most famous case analyzing the
constitutionality of a death sentence imposed on a non-killer, Tison v.
Arizona,12 though decided on grounds other than vicarious liability,
involved a death prosecution based in part on an aggravating factor whose
vicarious applicationwas not challenged by defense counsel.13 Moreover,
even if the practice of seeking death on a theory of vicarious-aggravator
liability was rare, this would not be a question of merely academic interest.
The Eighth Amendment requires that a jurisdiction’s capital sentencing
9. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972)).
10. Our research has not revealed a single article that addresses the question of whether and
to what extent death-eligibility factors may be imputed to non-killers through theories of vicarious
or derivative liability. To date, scholarship in this field has focused on the potential constitutional
defects of executing a non-killer convicted exclusively on a felony murder theory. See, e.g., David
McCord, State Death Sentencing for Felony Murder Accomplices Under the Enmund and Tison
Standards, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 843, 843–45 (2000) [hereinafter State Death Sentence]; Richard A.
Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1103,
1104–05 (1990); Joseph Trigilio & Tracy Casadio, Executing Those Who Do Not Kill: A
Categorical Approach to Proportional Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1371, 1399–1400 (2011).
While few felony murderers who did not actually do the killing are sentenced to death, many nonkillers are convicted of murder under an accomplice or conspiracy theory and sentenced to death.
Accordingly, the issues of death-eligibility in this Article present concerns that are both more
common and less understood.
11. Not all cases in which the non-killer is sentenced to death will involve vicariousaggravator liability. For example, an aggravating factor that applies whenever “the actor was under
a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence of death at the time of the commission of the
homicide” would, apparently, apply directly to the non-killer defendant. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5202(1)(p) (LexisNexis 2000) (repealed 2001). That is to say, a limited class of aggravating factors
apply directly to the defendant, even though he is a non-killer, and do not require vicariousaggravator liability. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(b) (2012) (“The defendant was
previously convicted in this state of a [serious] felony”).
12. 481 U.S. 137, 150–58 (1987).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 166–67 (noting that the prosecution used killing for
financial gain and killing in a cruel and heinous way as aggravating factors); see also Enmund, 399
So. 2d at 1371–72 (noting that the trial judge relied on an aggravating factor specifying that “the
capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel”); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 589
(1978) (noting that the prosecution relied on an Ohio aggravating factor thatprovided “that the
murder was ‘committed for the purpose of escaping detection. . .’”). None of these aggravating
factors applies by their plain terms directly to the non-killer defendant.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 3

774

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

scheme impose meaningful legislative limits on the ability of a prosecutor
to pursue the death penalty.14 More specifically, if the only limit on the
imposition of a death sentence is the benevolence, or arbitrariness, of the
prosecutor, then that capital-sentencing system unconstitutionally fails to
provide meaningful standards for imposing the death penalty.
A vicariously imposed aggravating factor has the effect of imputing
heightened culpability to a less culpable defendant, and capital-sentencing
systems that permit such liability raise serious Eighth Amendment
concerns. The very purpose of aggravating factors—narrowing deatheligibility to the very worst of all killers—is undermined when an
aggravating factor is vicariously applied to a defendant. This Article thus
concludes that blanket vicarious liability for aggravating factors is not
constitutionally permissible.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the
limitations imposed by the Eighth Amendment in death penalty litigation.
Specifically, this Part introduces both the procedural aspects of the Eighth
Amendment—the use of aggravating and mitigating factors—as well as the
substantive limitations—primarily the requirement of proportionality—
imposed by that Amendment.15 Part II provides a general description of
common aggravating factors across the fifty states and the federal system
and provides a basic overview of how aggravating factors function in death
penalty litigation more generally. Next, in Part III, this Article summarizes
the law of vicarious liability, providing a taxonomy of the various theories
under which one defendant can be held liable for the actions of another.
Finally, Part IV considers how the theories of vicarious liability, if applied
mechanically to common aggravating factors, would create Eighth
Amendment concerns.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that the rote application of vicarious
liability principles in the capital-sentencing context is constitutionally
impermissible. Although the Eighth Amendment has not been read to
preclude a non-killer from receiving a sentence of death, it does bar the
imposition of the ultimate penalty when the defendant does not evince
personal culpability sufficient to justify a finding of one or more of the
statutorily enumerated aggravating factors. Specifically, this Article
proposes a novel four-step procedure for assessing whether a non-killer can
be made death-eligible under the Eighth Amendment.
14. Zant, 462 U.S. at 877–78 & 877 n.15; Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California
Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1290–91 (1997).
15. It might seem odd to divide the Eighth Amendment’s dual limits on capital sentencing
schemes into substantive and procedural limitations, but the Supreme Court has recognized such a
distinction. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 606 (2002) (suggesting that aggravating
factors are procedural limits); id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring) (agreeing); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 329–30, 335–36 (1989) (suggesting that cases have, as a substantive matter, prohibited
the imposition of the death penalty on certain classes of defendants on the grounds of
proportionality).
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I. THE EIGHT AMENDMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY
A. Procedural Limits: The Constitutional Function of Aggravating
Factors
The prominent role that aggravating factors play in the imposition of
capital punishment today is largely a historical and constitutional accident.
There is nothing in either the plain text of the Eighth Amendment16 or its
history17 that suggests, much less compels, a system of guided discretion
predicated on the use of statutorily enumerated aggravating factors.18 Only
through a slow process of procedural accretion did the American death
penalty become almost inexplicably linked to the concept of aggravating
factors. While a full history of the American death penalty is beyond the
scope of this Article,19 in order to appreciate the Eighth Amendment
problems intrinsic to vicarious liability for aggravating factors, a brief
overview of this history is necessary.
From colonial times all the way through 1971, the death penalty was
deemed substantially beyond the purview of the Eighth Amendment, if not
beyond the purview of the Constitution itself. The Fifth Amendment
explicitly refers to the death penalty,20 and for much of American history it
was taken for granted that the states were free to impose the penalty in a
method of their choosing. Moreover, the death penalty was the mandatory
punishment at common law for all who were convicted of murder and of
many other serious felonies.21 This approach quickly received a “negative
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
17. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of
Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345,
349 (1998) [hereinafter Aggravating and Mitigating Factors] (“In 1791, when the Eighth
Amendment was adopted, all of the states followed the common law practice of making death the
mandatory sentence for certain offenses.”).
18. The phrase “guided discretion” is used to indicate a capital-sentencing system in which
the sentencer’s ability to impose death is limited, or guided through a set of statutory procedures.
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976) (affirming a death sentence based on a
bifurcated trial and sentencing when the sentencer’s discretion was guided through the use of
enumerated factors); David Hesseltine, Comment, The Evolution of the Capital Punishment
Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and the Impact of Tuilaepa v. California on That
Evolution, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 593, 597 (1995) (“Under a guided discretion statute, aggravating
factors perform a constitutionally essential function in that the sentencing authority is required to
find at least one aggravating factor present in a case before the death penalty is even an option.”).
19. Other scholars have admirably covered this topic. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL
HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864–1982 (1984); James S. Liebman, Slow
Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963–2006, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (2007).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be deprived of life . . . without due process
of law.”).
21. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198 (1971) (“The growth of the law continued in
this country, where there was rebellion against the [common law] rule imposing a mandatory death
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verdict” from the colonies; as early as 1794, Pennsylvania divided its
murder statute into degrees, reserving the automatic death penalty for
murders of the first degree.22 Other states quickly followed suit; today,
nearly every state uses degrees of murder as the first slice at determining
which murderers should live and which should die.23
Yet this division of murder into degrees was merely a legislative choice,
made out of concern that juries—faced with a difficult choice between
acquittal and death—would choose not to convict factually guilty
defendants. For most of the death penalty’s history in this country, the
United States Supreme Court largely stayed out of the states’ decision
making regarding questions of life and death. In particular, it was long
accepted that there was no principled, statutory way of distinguishing
between those deserving of death and those who were less culpable.
Indeed, the hallmark of this era—from colonial times through the early
1970s—was the belief that it was the utmost in human hubris to imagine
that life or death decisions could be reduced to a set of rules. Most
famously, in 1971’s McGautha v. California decision, the Supreme Court
explained that “[t]o identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal
homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to
express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood
and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are
beyond present human ability.”24 Or as Justice William Brennan lamented
in his McGautha dissent, the capital sentencing framework in every
jurisdiction during this era was “purposely constructed to allow the
maximum possible variation from one case to the next.” 25 Justice Brennan
found it inconsistent with the constitutional mandate of fair procedures that
there was nothing in the sentencing statutes that prevented a particular
death sentence from “reflecting [a] merely random or arbitrary choice.”26
Justice Brennan’s call for a more rational and structured sentencing
process would not go unheeded for long. The era of pure discretion,
emphatically punctuated by McGautha, ended just one year later. In 1972,
sentence on all convicted murderers.”).
22. See, e.g., Frank Brenner, The Impulsive Murder and the Degree Device, 22 FORDHAM L.
REV. 274, 274 (1953) (“The first statute to divide the crime of murder into degrees, enacted in
Pennsylvania in 1794, was soon followed by like legislation in thirty-seven states and the District of
Columbia, so that today murder grading in the United States is a device [that] has about it the aura
of inertia associated with a matter, for better or worse, long settled.” (footnotes omitted)).
23. See Liebman, supra note 19, at 23, 27 (noting that mandatory death sentencing was
subject to “history’s negative verdict” on the practice); Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra
note 17, at 350 (noting that the accepted history is that “Tennessee, during the 1837–38 legislative
session, became the first state to give juries sentencing discretion in capital cases once they found a
defendant guilty of murder” and other states and the federal government followed suit shortly
thereafter).
24. 402 U.S. at 204.
25. Id. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26. Id.
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a fractured Court held in Furman v. Georgia that the era of unguided
discretion in capital sentencing was over.27 Furman’s practical impact was
to strike down as unconstitutional the discretionary capital-sentencing
systems that were the norm in every state that permitted executions.28 As
Professor James Liebman has explained:
From McGautha forward, the Court had assumed there were
only three types of capital sentencing—mandatory, legally
guided, and discretionary. McGautha ruled out the first two
sentencing options—mandatory given history's negative
verdict and legally guided because it could not be humanly
realized. Though Furman may have done nothing else, it
clearly ruled out the remaining discretionary method.29
Furman, then, requires that death penalty decisions not be left to the
arbitrary discretion of a jury. Instead, it requires meaningful procedural
mechanisms for identifying the worst crimes and the worst offenders,
reserving capital punishment only for the most deserving. Such a
momentous shift has aptly been described as the modern “Big Bang” of
capital punishment law.30
Contrary to the predictions of many lawyers and academics, however,
Furman did not mark the end of the death penalty in the United States.31
As the Court itself would later recognize:
Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk that the
death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected
group of offenders, the decision to impose it had to be guided
by standards so that the sentencing authority would focus on
the particularized circumstances of the crime and the
defendant.32

27. Although Furman was a plurality decision, there was a paragraph-long per curiam
holding that concluded that the death sentences imposed “in these cases” violated the Eighth
Amendment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1971); see also Corinna Barrett Lain,
Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007) (“Before Furman was decided in 1972, the
Eighth Amendment’s ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ clause was largely a dead letter in
constitutional law.”).
28. See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth
Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1753 n.78 (2008) (describing
Furman as “striking down all then-extant state death penalty laws”).
29. See Liebman, supra note 19, at 27 (footnotes omitted).
30. Sundby, supra note 1, at 1152.
31. See, e.g., Austin Sarat, Recapturing the Spirit of Furman: The American Bar Association
and the New Abolitionist Politics, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5 (1998) (describing
contemporaneous beliefs that Furman was heralding the death of capital punishment in the United
States as “quite naïve as well as somewhat forlorn”).
32. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976).
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Searching for a politically viable, constitutional alternative to the purely
discretionary sentencing that preceded Furman, many states turned to the
Model Penal Code’s (MPC) provisions on capital punishment.33 Just prior
to the Furman decision, the American Law Institute published the MPC,
which included provisions for a model capital-sentencing system that
attempted to develop a more structured approach to determining whether
death was the appropriate punishment in any given case. One scholar has
summarized the rise of the MPC provisions as states attempted to guide the
jury’s discretion as required by the post-Furman Eighth Amendment:
The new statutes fell into two basic categories. A number of
states sought to eliminate sentencing discretion altogether by
making the death penalty mandatory for certain offenses.
Many other states adopted an alternative approach patterned
in varying degrees on the death penalty provisions of the
Model Penal Code.
In a series of 1976 decisions, the Supreme Court struck down
mandatory death penalty provisions but upheld the statutes
based upon the Model Penal Code. As a result of these
decisions, all death penalty regimes now effectively follow
the basic structure of the Model Penal Code.34
In 1976, the Supreme Court upheld Georgia’s new MPC-based statute
in Gregg v. Georgia, while invalidating in Woodson v. North Carolina the
mandatory death sentencing regime that North Carolina had put in place
after Furman.35 Later decisions made clear that a death penalty regime
could not be mandatory even for a very narrow group of defendants. For
example, in Sumner v. Shuman, the Court held that a statute imposing a
mandatory death penalty when a prison inmate is convicted of murder
while serving a life sentence without possibility of parole violates the

33. See, e.g., MPC § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft May 4, 1962) (repealed 2009) (“The
Court, in exercising its discretion as to sentence, and the jury, in determining upon its verdict, shall
take into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances enumerated in Subsections (3) and
(4) and any other facts that it deems relevant, but it shall not impose or recommend sentence of
death unless it finds one of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Subsection (3) and further
finds that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.”).
34. Tom Stacy, Changing Paradigms in the Law of Homicide, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007, 1015–
16 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
35. Indeed, many constitutional scholars begin a discussion of the history of the death penalty
with Furman and Gregg. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:
Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 355, 361–62 (1995). In reality, there were four decisions decided on the same day in 1976,
three of which approved the less discretionary sentencing systems of states, and one that struck
down mandatory death-penalty statutes as unconstitutional. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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Eighth Amendment.36 Likewise, in Roberts v. Louisiana, the Supreme
Court invalidated a mandatory death penalty for the killing of a police
officer in the scope of her duties.37 The Court held that although in each
case the state had created a very narrow class of aggravated murders that
could fairly be called the worst of the worst, the state could not remove
from the sentencer the opportunity to consider facts in mitigation of either
the defendant or her crime.38
So just as Furman eliminated the purely discretionary death penalty,
Woodson and its line of cases eliminated the mandatory death penalty. Of
the three types of sentencing regimes identified above by Professor
Liebman—mandatory, legally guided, and discretionary—now only the
middle one remained. And the principal method for guiding sentencing
discretion—the procedure suggested by the MPC, adopted by most states,
and approved by the Court—was the creation of a list of factors that, if
proven, indicate that the murder was so egregious as to make the defendant
eligible for a sentence of death.39 It is typically the function of statutorily
enumerated aggravating factors, then, to distinguish the worst crimes and
criminals from those that are somewhat less bad.40 Or as the Court
explained in Zant v. Stephens, it is the aggravating circumstances that
“perform[] the function of narrowing the category of persons convicted of
murder who are eligible for the death penalty.”41 Death penalty
retentionists believed that aggravating factors could provide the sort of
“clear and objective standards” necessary to save the death penalty from
36. 483 U.S. 66, 77–78 (1987).
37. 431 U.S. 633, 636–37 (1976) (“There is a special interest in affording protection to these
public servants who regularly must risk their lives in order to guard the safety of other persons and
property. But it is incorrect to suppose that no mitigating circumstances can exist when the victim is
a police officer.”).
38. Sumner, 483 U.S. at 81 (“Past convictions of other criminal offenses can be considered as
a valid aggravating factor in determining whether a defendant deserves to be sentenced to death for
a later murder, but the inferences to be drawn concerning an inmate’s character and moral
culpability may vary depending on the nature of the past offense.”); Roberts, 431 U.S. at 636 (“To
be sure, the fact that the murder victim was a peace officer performing his regular duties may be
regarded as an aggravating circumstance.”).
39. The MPC called for aggravating factors to be balanced against evidence in mitigation of
the defendant’s crime. See supra note 33. In invalidating mandatory death sentences in Woodson
and its line of cases, the Supreme Court has made the consideration of mitigating factors a
necessary part of American capital punishment. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 304–05 (1976).
40. Aggravating factors simultaneously serve to guide the discretion of the sentencer and give
effect to the Eighth Amendment mandate that legislatures devise sentencing schemes that
meaningfully distinguish murderers so as to create a narrow class of death-eligible defendants. See,
e.g., Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net: Another Decade of Legislative Expansion of the
Death Penalty in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 6 (2006) (“A list of factors that make one
eligible for the death penalty serves both (1) the role of giving guidance to juries and judges, and
(2) the role of narrowing the group of murderers who are eligible for the death penalty.”).
41. 462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983).
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unconstitutionality.42 To this day, the rule of Gregg—approving guided
discretion based on statutorily enumerated aggravating factors—continues
to be the principal means of determining who receives the death penalty.
Aggravating factors thus function as the critical mechanism for ensuring
that an otherwise death-eligible defendant43 is sentenced only through
procedures that prevent the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.44
In sum, because of the development of the Court’s procedural Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, the American death penalty is now inextricably
linked to the use of aggravating factors.45 Aggravating factors, presented to
the jury during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial, are the procedural
mechanism through which our justice system distinguishes the worst of the
worst.46 Sggravators function as a sort of rough proxy for the defendant’s
moral culpability.47
B. Substantive Eighth Amendment Limits on the Imposition of the
Death Penalty
In addition to the myriad procedural rules that now govern the
imposition of the death penalty,48 the Supreme Court has also enunciated a
42. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197–98 (1976); cf. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,
427 (1980) (striking down an aggravator because it failed to provide a “meaningful basis for
distinguishing” death-eligible defendants) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188).
43. For an eloquent elaboration on death ineligibility, see Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility
and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 329, 346–56 (2010).
44. For purposes of this Article, we accept the aggravator–mitigator system as the means by
which states achieve the constitutional mandate to meaningfully guide the discretion of the
sentencer. To be sure, there is a well-founded critique of Gregg’s system of Eighth Amendment
guided discretion as utterly failing to impose predictability and avoid arbitrariness. See, e.g., Joseph
L. Hoffman, Where’s the Buck?—Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death
Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1159 (“Maybe Justice [John Marshall] Harlan was right all along
in McGautha. Perhaps the best we can do in the death penalty area is to turn this intensely moral
decision over to twelve good people and let them sweat blood over it. Perhaps our attempts to create
‘rationality’ from within, by drafting lists of ‘aggravators’ and ‘mitigators,’ merely permit the jury
to conclude that there is a legally ‘correct’ answer to the sentencing question.” (footnotes omitted));
Chelsea Creo Sharon, The “Most Deserving” of Death: The Narrowing Requirement and the
Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
223, 224 (2011) (arguing “that death penalty statutes with a litany of aggravating factors [do not
meaningfully guide the sentencer’s discretion], rendering death eligible the vast majority of
murderers, many of whom cannot be classified as the ‘worst’ offenders, and thus increasing the risk
of arbitrary capital sentencing”).
45. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983).
46. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (holding that aggravating factors must be
presented to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
47. For a lucid summary of the history of aggravating factors, see Kirchmeier, supra note 40,
at 5–8 (citing Godfrey v. Georgia and explaining that “aggravating factors must give jurors clear
standards for determining who receives the death penalty”).
48. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 35, at 372 (describing the post-Gregg process of
judicial regulation in the realm of capital punishment).
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substantive Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence. Most significantly,
the Court has held that the Eighth Amendment requires proportionality
between the crime committed and the punishment imposed—that is,
regardless of the procedures followed, the sentence imposed in a particular
case cannot be disproportionate to the crime in fact committed. 49 Applying
this proportionality requirement, over the last quarter-century the Supreme
Court has rather systematically removed categories of crimes and criminals
from the ranks of the death-eligible.50 Specifically, the Supreme Court has
held that death is inappropriately disproportionate for a crime committed
by a minor (Roper v. Simmons),51 for a crime committed by a mentally
disabled individual (Atkins v. Virginia),52 and for a defendant who is
incompetent at the time of the execution (Ford v. Wainwright).53 In each of
these cases, the death penalty was deemed disproportionate—not to the
offense committed, but to the status of the offender.54
In other contexts, the Court has held that the death penalty is
disproportionate to the crime committed, rather than with regard to an
individual’s personal characteristics. For example, the death penalty was
deemed disproportionate for the rape of an adult woman (Coker v.
Georgia),55 and then later for the rape of a child (Kennedy v. Louisiana).56
As the Court has explained, “capital punishment must be limited to those
offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and
whose extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution.”57
49. Professor Ian Farrell has explained that proportionality “is one of the most fundamental
ingredients of our sense of just punishment”; according to Farrell, “Of the Justices who have
occupied seats on the Court over the last century, only Justices [Antonin] Scalia and [Clarence]
Thomas have maintained that the Eighth Amendment does not contain any requirement that [the]
punishment be proportionate to the offense committed.” Ian P. Farrell, Gilbert & Sullivan and
Scalia: Philosophy, Proportionality, and the Eighth Amendment, 55 VILL. L. REV. 321, 321, 322–
23 (2010).
50. See Kovarsky, supra note 43, at 350–56; see also John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and
Quantitative Proportionality: A Specific Critique of Retributivism, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 78–79
(identifying two categories of proportionality review—“qualitative proportionality” and
“quantitative proportionality”).
51. 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
52. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); see Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of
Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 514 (2004) (describing Atkins as having “refocused
doctrinal attention on the rich, and largely unexplored, substantive core of the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments”).
53. 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986).
54. Charles S. Doskow, The Juvenile Death Penalty: The Beat Goes On, 24 J. JUV. L. 45, 55
(2003-2004) (“If the details of crimes of the defendants in Penry, Stanford and Atkins are reviewed,
it is hard to conclude that their perpetrators do not deserve the maximum sanction the law has to
offer. Capital punishment is not disproportionate to the offense by that standard. Only the
defendant’s status can render it disproportionate . . . .”).
55. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
56. 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008).
57. Id. at 420 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)) (internal quotation
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The Court’s cases lead ineluctably to the conclusion that a sentence of
death is unconstitutionally disproportionate for crimes short of murder—
that is to say, the class of persons most deserving of death is a subset of
those who are guilty of a murder.58
Notably, however, the Court has also made clear that under its
proportionality doctrine, not all persons guilty of murder are for that reason
eligible for the death penalty. Taking the doctrine one critical step
further—beyond limits on the status of the defendant and limits on the
nature of the crime for which he is convicted—the Court, in a pair of cases,
has provided guidance as to whether and under what circumstances those
convicted of murder who did not themselves kill may be put to death. These
two cases, Enmund v. Florida and Tison v. Arizona, stand for the
proposition that some—but only some—non-killers may constitutionally
be put to death for their crimes. As this Article elaborates, the collision of
this question—when may non-killers be put to death?—with the
predominance of aggravating factors in modern death penalty
jurisprudence provides a platform for understanding the constitutionality of
vicarious aggravating-factor liability.
1. Enmund v. Florida59
While Earl Enmund waited for them nearby in a car, Samson and
Janette Armstrong rang the doorbell of the victims’ rural home with the
intention of robbing them.60 The robbery went awry, a gunfight ensued,
and Samson Armstrong shot both victims.61 The Armstrongs then returned
to the car, the three drove off and were subsequently apprehended, and
both Enmund and Samson Armstrong62 were sentenced to death for their
role in the robbery and killings.63
On appeal, Enmund argued that because he did not take a life, attempt
to take a life, or intend to take a life, he could not be sentenced to death
consistent with the Eighth Amendment.64 The United States Supreme
Court agreed.65 Analogizing to its recent decision in Coker that the death
marks omitted).
58. Actually, the Court limits the death penalty to those who kill or “attempt to kill.” Id. at
421 (“[A] death sentence for one who raped but did not kill a child, and who did not intend to assist
another in killing the child, is unconstitutional . . . .”); id. at 435 (noting that the crime at issue
caused the victim “prolonged physical and mental suffering” but still holding that the death penalty
was disproportionate).
59. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
60. Id. at 784.
61. Id.
62. Janette Armstrong was tried separately and sentenced to three life terms. Id. at n.1.
63. Enmund was convicted of both robbery and murder under a felony murder theory. Id. at
785.
64. Id. at 787.
65. Id. at 788.
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sentence was disproportionate for the rape of an adult woman, the Court
noted that Florida was in a distinct minority of states that permitted a death
sentence to be imposed on felony murderers without any showing of
additional participation in the felony or killing.66 However, the Court noted
that it could not be swayed entirely by the views of the several states and
that its obligation was to reach its own conclusions regarding the
appropriateness of death in these circumstances.67 The Court summarized
its conclusion on this point as follows:
For purposes of imposing the death penalty, Enmund’s
criminal culpability must be limited to his participation in the
robbery, and his punishment must be tailored to his personal
responsibility and moral guilt. Putting Enmund to death to
avenge two killings that he did not commit and had no
intention of committing or causing does not measurably
contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal
gets his just deserts. This is the judgment of most of the
legislatures that have recently addressed the matter, and we
have no reason to disagree with that judgment for purposes of
construing and applying the Eighth Amendment.68
2. Tison v. Arizona69
Enmund was decided by a narrow 5–4 vote.70 Only five years later, the
Court reconsidered Enmund in Tison v. Arizona, deciding by a similar 5–4
that the death penalty could be imposed upon Ricky and Raymond Tison
despite the fact that the Tisons, like Earl Enmund, neither killed, attempted
to kill, nor intended to kill the victims in their case. The grisly facts of the
Tisons’ case were set forth by the Court in some detail. The two brothers
broke their father and another convicted murderer out of prison by
smuggling a small arsenal of deadly weapons into the jail in an ice chest.71
In the ensuing escape, the senior Tison and the other escapee kidnapped
and ultimately killed a family of four.72 While opinions differed regarding
the role the Tison brothers played in the killings, it seems clear that they
66. Id. at 789–91.
67. Id. at 797.
68. Id. at 801. It is worth noting that there is language in the Enmund decision that might
fairly be read as permitting a sentence of death for a felony murder accomplice based on
recklessness. See State Death Sentence, supra note 10, at 850–51 (parsing the language of Enmund
and concluding that it was ambiguous as to whether death was reserved for those accomplices who
intended for the victim to die); id. at 851–52 (“[T]he Court further muddled the opinion by failing
to define the key concept of ‘intent to kill.’”).
69. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
70. Enmund, 554 U.S. at 783.
71. Tison, 481 U.S. at 139.
72. Id. at 141.
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neither killed themselves nor assisted in the killing itself.73 The brothers
were nonetheless tried separately; convicted of robbery, kidnapping, and
murder (under a theory of felony murder); and sentenced to death.74
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether its decision five
years earlier in Enmund foreclosed the imposition of the Tisons’ death
penalty.75 The Court held that its Enmund decision stood simply for the
proposition that the death penalty was impermissibly disproportionate
punishment for the crime of felony murder simpliciter.76 Earl Enmund was
a minor participant in a robbery and had no proven mens rea with regard to
the killing engaged in by his confederates.77 By contrast, the Tison brothers
were significant participants in both the jailbreak and the kidnapping;78
they were also present at the killings (or at least very close by) and did
nothing to stop them.79 Perhaps most important for the Court, the brothers,
unlike Enmund, had a culpable mental state with regard to death.80 By
breaking two convicted murderers out of prison, arming them, and
assisting in their kidnapping of four innocent victims, both brothers
demonstrated a level of mental culpability that the Court charitably
described as recklessness; the brothers were aware of a grave risk that their
conduct would cause death and proceeded with it nonetheless.81 As the
Court wrote:
A critical facet of the individualized determination of
culpability required in capital cases is the mental state with
which the defendant commits the crime. Deeply ingrained in
our legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the
criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and,
therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished.82
3. Summary
Although at first blush inconsistent, Enmund and Tison both remain the
law of the land today. While the language the Court used in Enmund—that
the death penalty cannot be imposed on one who does not kill, attempt to
kill, or intend to kill—would seem to preclude a death sentence for the
Tison brothers, the latter case limited the former to its facts. It is true that
73. Id. at 138.
74. Id. at 141–43.
75. Id. at 145–46. It is worth noting that the killing in Tison occurred before the Court’s
decision in Enmund.
76. Id. at 147.
77. Id. at 147, 149.
78. Id. at 139.
79. Id. at 141.
80. Id. at 151.
81. Id. at 151–52.
82. Id. at 156.
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those, like Earl Enmund, who do not have a culpable mental state with
regard to death cannot be put to death. But it is also true that non-killers
like the Tison brothers who are both significantly83 involved in the events
leading up to the killing and who have a culpable mental state with regard
to death may be executed without running afoul of the Eighth
Amendment’s proportionality principle.
Some commentators have attempted to reconcile Enmund and Tison by
emphasizing that Enmund was not present when the killing occurred.84 To
be sure, when a defendant is merely a “minor actor” and he is “not on the
scene,” the death penalty will oftentimes be indefensibly disproportionate.
But the reason the Eighth Amendment is offended in such circumstances
relates to individual culpability and not simply to the defendant’s location
at the time of the killing.85 Specifically, in distinguishing the facts of Tison
from those of Enmund, the Court emphasized the importance of mens rea
in measuring the culpability of the individual.86 And clearly, mens rea
suffuses the criminal law. At least since the promulgation of the MPC—
but really for hundreds of years before that in less explicit ways—mens rea
has been the primary measure of individual culpability.87 In Part III, below,
83. As to whether the distinction between minor and major participants makes any
constitutional difference, Richard Rosen has explained that nearly “any participant” can be labeled a
major participant. Rosen, supra note 10, at 1154 (“Major and minor just describe two indefinite
areas on a continuum of participation . . . .”).
84. See, e.g., State Death Sentence, supra note 10, at 874–75 (reasoning that, at least in the
felony murder context, “[u]nless the sentencer is completely convinced that the defendant was
present at the scene of the murders, the defendant is death ineligible”); id. at 876 (concluding that
Enmund’s absence from the murder scene was the “card that trumped his status as a significant
participant” and concluding that if Enmund had been present “the Court’s analysis would probably
have been different”). Presumably, if there was murder liability under a complicity theory other than
felony murder, one that required culpability on the part of the defendant, then Professor David
McCord would not insist on a rigid presence requirement as a prerequisite for satisfying the Eighth
Amendment proportionality requirements.
85. The Supreme Court, 1986 Term—Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 142 (1987)
(“[F]actors such as major participation in the underlying felony or presence at the scene of the
killing may illuminate the defendant’s mental state regarding the killing . . . .”).
86. Because Tison simply decided what it called the “intermediate case” where a defendant’s
“participation is major and whose mental state is one of reckless indifference to the value of human
life,” Tison, 481 U.S. at 152, it seems reasonable to conclude that a minor participant, like Enmund,
who had an intent to kill would also be death-eligible. Thus, at least two classes of felony murder
accomplices may be sentenced to death: (1) those who intended to kill, regardless of whether they
played a minor role; and (2) those whose participation was major and whose mens rea was at least
reckless. Of course, in many cases the only evidence of mens rea will be the extent of the
defendant’s participation in the felony, thus causing the two inquiries to blur into one. See State
Death Sentence, supra note 10, at 882 (“[D]efendant’s ‘participation’ in the felony will usually be
the primary evidence of his mental state with respect to the killing.”).
87. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the Limits of
Culpability’s Relevance, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110–11 (2012) (recognizing that central
to the MPC is the notion that “[m]ens rea must attach to every normatively significant element of
the offense as a means to measure culpability”).
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we return to the question of mens rea and culpability, demonstrating that
pure vicarious liability for aggravating factors fails to adequately take into
account the individual culpability of a non-killer.
C. Synthesizing the Substantive and Procedural Eighth Amendment
Limitations
As a procedural matter, Furman ushered in an era of Eighth
Amendment oversight that requires the states to create legislative standards
that separate out the worst of the worst. For the last thirty-five years, the
states have been required to create a meaningful system of guiding the
discretion of the capital sentencer. As a substantive matter, the death
penalty is not available in those cases where a death sentence would be
disproportionate to either the defendant or his crime.88 Together, these
rules impose significant limits on who can receive a death sentence.89 A
death sentence that would otherwise be proportionate for a non-killer—
because he satisfies the Tison–Enmund requirements—is barred unless the
prosecution can prove the presence of at least one aggravating factor.90 An
under-examined question in this regard is the role that vicarious liability
88. Commentators have recently argued that the death penalty for felony murder accomplices
is always disproportionate. See Trigilio & Casadio, supra note 10, at 1371 (recognizing the
resurgence of Court interest in categorical proportionality review under the Eighth Amendment); id.
at 1400–01 (concluding that the evolving standards of decency have shifted such that only ten
jurisdictions allow the death penalty in “adherence to Tison’s minimal requirements”). As the title
of that article suggests, these commentators, at times, argue that the death penalty is
disproportionate for all non-killers, at least if the non-killer did not intend to kill. However, arguing
that those who “neither kill nor intend to kill should be ‘categorically’ exempted from” capital
punishment proves too much. Id. at 1407 (footnote omitted). It is not the case that all death
sentences for non-killers arise in the context of felony murder; there are plenty of death-eligible
cases in which the defendant was an accomplice to a first-degree murder under a theory of gross, or
extreme, recklessness. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-102 (West 2012) (first-degree
murder). Indeed, Joseph Trigilio and Tracy Casadio are often more precise and recognize that their
discussion is limited to “felony-murder accomplices who do not intend to kill.” Trigilio & Casadio,
supra note 10, at 1408. In other words, concluding that death is disproportionate for felony murder
does not compel the conclusion that death is disproportionate for all accomplice non-killers. This
Article accepts the constitutionality of the death penalty for non-killers in the abstract, but considers
the procedural limits on such sentences.
89. Some courts seem to imply that the Enmund–Tison analysis resolves the question of
vicarious-aggravator liability. For example, in People v. Borrego, 774 P.2d 854 (Colo. 1989), the
Colorado Supreme Court explained: “Since complicity is a theory that necessitates holding one
person legally accountable for the behavior of another, a defendant’s constitutional rights are
violated if the jury in a capital offense sentencing hearing is given a complicity instruction.” Id. at
857 (citation omitted). Of course, even without a complicity instruction a non-killer could be
charged under some aggravating factors. See infra Section IV.B.
90. Cf. Rosen, supra note 10, at 1165 (“Because a defendant does not fall into one of the rigid
categories of defendants for whom the death penalty is proscribed does not mean either that the
death sentence is proportionate or that the court has reviewed the defendant’s case for
disproportionality. It merely means that the death sentence imposed in the particular case is not
disproportionate for the particular reason embodied in the particular rule.”).
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can play in the process of proving aggravators. That is, can vicarious
liability both make the defendant guilty of a capital crime and
simultaneously satisfy the aggravating factor requirement, making the
defendant eligible for the death penalty? After examining several common
aggravating factors, we turn to that very question.
II. COMMON EXAMPLES OF AGGRAVATING FACTORS
In light of the Court’s explicit approval of the aggravating-factor model
of guided discretion, not surprisingly, most states that have retained the
death penalty have opted to use a capital system based on the use of
aggravating factors. With only a few exceptions,91 state sentencing systems
recognize that a defendant convicted of murder is eligible for a sentence of
death if, and only if, the state is able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the existence of an aggravating factor. The sentencing procedures in
Arizona are illustrative:
At the aggravation phase, the trier of fact shall make a
special finding on whether each alleged aggravating
circumstance has been proven based on the evidence that was
presented at the trial or at the aggravation phase. If the trier of
fact is a jury, a unanimous verdict is required to find that the
aggravating circumstance has been proven. . . . If the trier of
fact unanimously finds no aggravating circumstances, the
court shall then determine whether to impose a sentence of
life or natural life on the defendant. . . . .
The penalty phase shall be held immediately after the trier
of fact finds at the aggravation phase that one or more of the
aggravating circumstances . . . have been proven. . . .
At the penalty phase, the defendant and the state may
present any evidence that is relevant to the determination of
whether there is mitigation that is sufficiently substantial to
call for leniency. In order for the trier of fact to make this
determination, . . . the state may present any evidence that
demonstrates that the defendant should not be shown
leniency . . . .
The trier of fact shall determine unanimously whether
death is the appropriate sentence.92
91. Most notably, Texas does not use a true aggravating-circumstance system. Instead, the
Texas system, approved by the Supreme Court in Jurek, asks the jury to answer three questions and
only if the answer to all three is yes is death permitted. Rosen, supra note 10, at 1123 n.53; cf. id.
at 1123 (noting that states do not have to follow the aggravating-factor approach to narrowing and
explaining that some “states have chosen instead to narrow the class of [death-eligible] defendants
by providing restrictive definitions of [first-degree] or capital murder.”). i
92. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752 (E)–(H) (2012).
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Similarly, the Colorado capital statute provides that the jury shall not
render a verdict of death unless it unanimously finds and specifies in
writing that: “(A) At least one aggravating factor has been proved; and
(B) There are insufficient mitigating factors to outweigh the aggravating
factor or factors that were proved.”93
Georgia’s system is slightly different in that it provides the sentencing
jury with more discretion as to the ultimate sentencing decision.94 When
the Georgia capital statute was challenged in 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court
certified a question to the Georgia Supreme Court asking it to explain the
role that aggravating factors play in the ultimate selection of a life or death
sentence. Notably, the state Supreme Court responded that once at least
one aggravating circumstance is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the
existence or nonexistence of one or more aggravating factors played no
particular role in determining the sentence.95 Instead, once an aggravating
factor is found to exist, the narrowing required by Furman is complete and
the Georgia statute leaves to the “unfettered discretion of the jury” the
question of whether the defendant lives or dies.96 Although this procedure
struck many as an admission that the Georgia statute resembled a
McGautha-Era, open-ended, discretionary statute, the United States
Supreme Court held in Zant that the statute passed constitutional muster.
The common denominator in all of these systems, despite their
significant differences, is the use of the aggravating factor as the means of
narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants.97 It is the aggravatingfactor analysis that determines whether “the character of the individual and
the circumstances of the crime” justify the imposition of a death
sentence.98 The remainder of this Part serves to introduce some of the most
common aggravating factors—that is, to provide examples of the sort of
statutorily enumerated facts that suffice for Eighth Amendment purposes to
make one eligible for the ultimate punishment. There are two general types
of aggravators: (1) facts relating to the nature of the murder, or the
defendant’s motivation for the murder; and (2) facts relating to either the
93. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(b)(II)(A)–(B) (West 2012).
94. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (West 2012).
95. Georgia, because of its approach to capital sentencing, is referred to as a non-weighing
state. Non-weighing in this sense means that the sentence is not limited to merely weighing the
aggravating factors against the mitigating factors; instead, the ultimate sentencing decision is more
open-ended and less structured. See, e.g., Justin Marceau & Sam Kamin, The Facts About Ring v.
Arizona and the Jury’s Role in Capital Sentencing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 576 (2011)
(“Georgia’s statute, which was the subject of both the Furman and Gregg decisions, is a
paradigmatic example of a non-weighing statute.”).
96. Id. at 576–77 (discussing Zant and Georgia’s capital-sentencing system).
97. See State Death Sentence, supra note 10, at 846 (recognizing that in order to give
meaning to the requirement that death-eligibility be “limited to murders that can, by some rational
criterion, be deemed ‘worse’ than most” states must enact procedural mechanisms for this purpose,
and most have done so by “specifying ‘aggravating circumstances’”).
98. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878–79 (1983).
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victim’s or the defendant’s status at the time of the murder.99
This Article does not attempt to generate a complete list of all
aggravating factors across all capital-sentencing schemes; instead, this
Article’s hope is to provide a representative sample of some of the most
common and frequently relied upon aggravating factors.100
A. Aggravating Factors Relating to the Murder Itself
1. Cruel and Heinous Killings
Many scholars have observed that one of the most ubiquitous
aggravating factors is the statutory factor allowing a defendant to be
deemed death-eligible if the crime was committed “in an especially
heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.”101 An illustrative example of this sort
99. Obviously there are a number of plausible ways to categorize the range of aggravating
factors. One scholar has catalogued every aggravating factor in every state with capital punishment,
and he has further subdivided the aggravating factors such that he concludes there are four
categories. According to Professor Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier:
First, there are factors that determine [death-eligibility] based upon specific facts
surrounding the murder. Second, some factors focus on the defendant’s motivation
in committing the murder. Third, some factors focus on the defendant’s status at
the time of the murder. Fourth, some factors focus on the status of the victim.
Kirchmeier, supra note 40, at 17–18 (footnotes omitted).
100. For a comprehensive list of the aggravating factors used across all jurisdictions, see
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 17, at 400–30 (compiling a list of forty-five
different aggravating circumstances that were in use throughout all capital sentencing systems as of
1998). It should be noted that in addition to the statutory aggravators, as required for deatheligibility, a number of jurisdictions—all non-weighing jurisdictions—allow the sentencer to assess
non-statutory aggravating factors when determining the ultimate question of life or death. In other
words, although non-statutory aggravators do not serve the narrowing function essential to this
Article, they do play a role in all non-weighing jurisdictions in determining whether a defendant
will live or die. See, e.g., Donald M. Houser, Reconciling Ring v. Arizona with the Current
Structure of the Federal Capital Murder Trial: The Case for Trifurcation, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
349, 354–55 (2007) (“Unlike statutory aggravating factors, which must be established for the
defendant to be eligible for the death penalty, [non-statutory] aggravating factors are neither
sufficient nor necessary for the jury to sentence the defendant to death. Only if the jury has first
found the existence of at least one intent factor and one statutory aggravating factor does a [nonstatutory] aggravating factor become relevant to the jury’s determination of whether to impose the
death penalty.” (footnotes omitted)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (2006) (requiring at least one
statutory aggravating factor to be found before the defendant is deemed eligible for death, and
permitting the jury to balance mitigation against statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors);
U.S. v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1106–07 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The Supreme Court has dealt with the
issue of non-statutory aggravating factors in state capital punishment statutes and has held the use
of non-statutory aggravating factors permissible.”); Adam Thurschwell, After Ring, 15 FED. SENT’G.
REP. 97, 101 (2002) (“In the technical parlance of the Supreme Court’s capital jurisprudence,
statutory aggravators serve to ‘narrow’ the class of convicted murderers to those ‘eligible’ for
execution, while [non-statutory] aggravators enter in the sentencing calculus only at the ‘selection’
stage . . . .”).
101. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(j) (2012). Cruel-and-heinous aggravators, although
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of statutory-eligibility factor is contained in California’s capital-sentencing
provisions, which isolate as eligible for death those defendants where the
murders involved are “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity.”102 Even the state of Virginia, which recognizes
only two death-qualifying factors, regards a killing that was “outrageously
or wantonly vile” as sufficing for death-eligibility.103 Notably, there is a
split in jurisdictions regarding the wording of this aggravating factor that
has not attracted judicial or academic attention. Specifically, whereas
statutes like California’s dictates only that the murder was “especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel,”104 other jurisdictions seem to specify that the
defendant himself must have acted with the requisite cruelty. For instance,
the Connecticut statute provides that “[t]he defendant committed the
offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner.”105 While these
variations in language are more likely a product of chance or caprice than
reasoned legislative judgments, as this Article will show, these subtle
variations play a powerful role in the vicarious application of the atrocious,
heinous, and cruel aggravator.
2. Pecuniary Gain
Another common aggravating factor pertaining to the crime relates to a
pecuniary motive for the killing.106 An example is Florida’s capitalsentencing statute, which allows for death-eligibility if “[t]he capital felony
was committed for pecuniary gain.”107 The Florida statute, then, is focused
commonplace, are very controversial. On multiple occasions the Supreme Court has cautioned
against overly vague and amorphous aggravators. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653
(1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 429
(1980). Nevertheless, imprecise aggravators of this form persist. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, The
“Especially Heinous” Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases—The Standardless Standard,
64 N.C. L. REV. 941, 944 (1986).
102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(14) (West 2012). For a list of all the cruel and heinous
aggravators used by states, see Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 17, at 400 n.348.
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (2012).
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(14) (West 2012).
105. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(i)(4) (2012). For a statute that seems to combine both
approaches to the aggravator, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(l) (2012) (“The murder was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind,
use of an explosive device or poison or the defendant used such means on the victim prior to
murdering the victim.”). This statute contains both language describing the crime—“the murder was
outrageously or wantonly vile”—and describing the participation of the defendant: “[T]he
defendant used such means on the victim prior to murdering the victim.” Id. (emphasis added).
106. Professor Kirchmeier counted more than thirty-two states that use some version of this
aggravating factor as of 1998. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 17, at 410 n.367
(compiling all the state statutes).
107. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(f) (2012). The Colorado statute is nearly identical, providing
that the murder “was committed for pecuniary gain.” COLO. REV. STAT.§ 18-1.3-1201(5)(h) (Lexis
2012).
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on the motive of the killing alone, and not on who did the killing.108 By
contrast, statutes in other jurisdictions focus both on the motive for the
killing and the fact that the defendant himself, acting as principal,
committed the murder. For example, the federal death-penalty statute
specifies that “[t]he defendant committed the offense as consideration for
the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary
value.”109 The interpretations of these statutes seem to be in agreement that
the pecuniary-gain aggravator applies whenever the defendant commits the
murder in order to obtain any property of value110—that is, the aggravator
applies not just to murders for hire, but to murders done in order to obtain
anything of pecuniary value.111
3. Felony Murder
Another common aggravating circumstance is that a death occurred
during, or in flight, from certain enumerated felonies. As with other
aggravating factors, there is variation among the jurisdictions with regard
to the required participation of a particular individual. For instance, some
states, such as Colorado, specify that the defendant himself must have
“intentionally caused the death of a person” during the course of the felony
in order for the aggravator to apply to him.112 That is to say, Colorado’s
statute raises questions of both mens rea and of causation; not only must
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(8) (2006).
110. Seemingly every jurisdiction that has interpreted the pecuniary-gain aggravating factor
has held that the possibility of a financial reward must have been the motive for the murder itself
and that robbery must not have been a mere afterthought.
111. Courts in many jurisdictions have held, for example, that the aggravator applies where the
defendant committed the murder in order to steal a car. See Schad v. Ryan, 671 F.3d 708, 725 (9th
Cir. 2011) (holding that, under Arizona law, where there was evidence that Defendant used the
victim’s vehicle and credit cards within a day of the murder, the evidence “rationally supported the
application of the [pecuniary-gain] aggravating factor”); Thessing v. State, 230 S.W.3d 526, 539
(Ark. 2006) (holding that the pecuniary-gain aggravator had been proven where Defendant stole the
victim’s car and other personal possessions after committing the murder; and the fact that the State
failed to introduce evidence that Defendant’s motive had been formed prior to the murder, or
evidence regarding the value of the stolen items, was immaterial); Porter v. State, 429 So. 2d 293,
296 (Fla. 1983) (holding that, where the State proved that Defendant “took his victims’ automobile,
television, silverware, jewelry, and other items,” the pecuniary-gain aggravator had been proven;
and the fact that Defendant subsequently threw the stolen property away without profiting from it
was immaterial).
112. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(g) (2012) (“[I]n the course of or in furtherance of
such or immediate flight therefrom, the defendant intentionally caused the death of a person other
than one of the participants . . . .”); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) (2007) (“The defendant committed
the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit [a
felony].”). The Colorado statute specifies a separate aggravator for the killing of a person during a
kidnapping. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(d) (2012) (“The defendant intentionally killed a
person kidnapped or being held as a hostage by the defendant or by anyone associated with the
defendant.”).
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the defendant have caused the death himself, he must have done so with a
culpable mental state—in this case, purpose. By contrast, other
jurisdictions recognize the existence of the aggravator whenever the
“death, or injury resulting in death, occurred during the commission or
attempted commission of, or during the immediate flight from the
commission of,” certain enumerated felonies.113 In contrast to a Colorado
defendant, a defendant in such a state is made death-eligible whenever a
death occurs during the commission of a felony in which the defendant is
involved; it need be shown neither that the defendant killed nor that he had
any mens rea with regard to the death of the victim. Such legislative
distinctions, even if likely inadvertent, must be given effect. Although all
felony murder aggravators focus on deaths that occur in the course of a
felony, they are very different in the sweep of their coverage.
4. Grave Risk of Death to Others
Another aggravating factor, and one that is often present, is that the
murder of one person put others at risk of death or injury. Illustrative is the
Utah Code, which provides that an aggravating factor exists whenever the
“actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than the
victim . . . .”114 Many public shootings or other acts of violence in crowded
areas will satisfy this aggravator. But again, there is a question whether this
aggravating factor can, as a matter of statutory construction, apply to a
non-killer who is guilty of murder. Does the defendant satisfy this
aggravating factor by creating a risk of death to others even if he does not
actually kill the victim?
Consider an example. Imagine two co-felons, A and B, both of whom
shoot at V and V’s friends from a passing car. Assume that A strikes and
kills V but that B misses all of the intended victims. A, obviously, is liable
for premeditated murder and has satisfied the grave risk of death
aggravator; he is thus clearly eligible for a sentence of death. But what
about B, his co-felon? B is likely liable for the killing itself under either an
aiding-and-abetting or coconspirator theory—B emboldened A’s homicidal
acts and intended to do so; there was an agreement between A and B
inferable from their conduct and the killing of V was committed in
furtherance of that agreement. Furthermore, B satisfies the Enmund–Tison
113. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(1) (2006); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(4) (2012) (“The capital
offense was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice in the commission
of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or attempting to commit, rape, robbery,
burglary or kidnapping.”); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(d) (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(d)
(2012) (“The capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
accomplice, in the commission of [a felony.]”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(2) (2011) (“The
offense was aggravated kidnapping that resulted in the death of the victim or the death by direct
action of the defendant of a person who rescued or attempted to rescue the victim.”).
114. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(c) (West 2012).
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prerequisites for the death penalty—he was present and actively
participating in the felony, had major participation in it, and shared A’s
homicidal intent. The only barrier to the imposition of a death sentence
upon B, therefore, is whether the grave risk of death to others aggravating
factor is proven with regard to him. There are two ways to conceive of B’s
culpability with regard to this aggravator: First, B may satisfy the
aggravating factor through his own conduct. That is, it may be sufficient to
show that he created a grave risk of death himself and that the aggravating
factor is thus satisfied even though he himself did not kill.115 The other is
to hold B liable for the factor vicariously; because he is guilty of the crime
and because the principal killed while creating a grave risk of death to
others, the factor is satisfied with regard to B as well. Whether either of
these theories will satisfy the aggravating factor will depend on two things:
the wording of the aggravating factor and the constitutionality of vicarious
liability for aggravating factors.
B. Aggravating Factors Relating to the Status of the Defendant or the
Victim
1. The Status of the Defendant
One of the most common aggravating factors based on the status of the
defendant is the fact that the defendant has been convicted of a prior
violent felony. Many jurisdictions have an aggravator that applies
whenever the defendant has previously been convicted of a serious violent
felony.116 The federal death penalty in fact has three distinct priorconviction aggravators: (1) “Previous conviction of violent felony
involving firearm;”117 (2) “[p]revious conviction of offense for which a
sentence of death or life imprisonment was authorized;”118 and (3) the
“defendant has previously been convicted of 2 or more Federal or State
offenses, punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year.”119
Relatedly, many jurisdictions treat the fact of one’s incarceration at the
115. For example, under Colorado’s statute, applying the aggravating factor to B would require
a finding that B created a grave risk of death to others in the commission of the offense. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(i) (“In the commission of the offense, the defendant knowingly created a
grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense.”) (emphasis added).
Was the “commission of the offense” the shooting of the victim by A or, conceived more broadly,
did the “commission of the offense” include B’s firing into the passing vehicle with an intent to
kill?
116. The Colorado statute specifies that any prior conviction for a “class 1 or 2 felony
involving violence” suffices to make a defendant eligible for the death penalty. COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-1.3-1201(5)(b) (2012).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(2) (2006).
118. Id. at § 3592(c)(3).
119. Id. at § 3592(c)(4). Arizona’s capital-sentencing statute also appears to recognize three
classes of prior-conviction aggravating factors. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(F)(1), (2), (8)
(2012).
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time of the murder as an aggravating factor—in those jurisdictions, anyone
who commits a first-degree murder in a prison is death-eligible.120 For both
of the aggravating factors just listed, the plain statutory language generally
emphasizes the fact that the defendant who is convicted of first-degree
murder must have a qualifying prior conviction; there is no reference to or
discussion of vicarious liability.121 One could imagine a case, however, in
which the actual killer does not personally satisfy any of the aggravating
factors but his accomplice does. For example, if B encourages and assists
A in shooting a random stranger, it is possible that no aggravating factors
will apply to A. However, if B has a prior conviction or is currently
incarcerated, it is plausible that B (the non-killer) is death-eligible and A
(the killer) is not. Alternatively, if the aggravating factor applies
vicariously, yet another odd result is conceivable. Imagine that B—who
neither has a criminal record nor is incarcerated—helps A to commit a
murder within a prison. If the “already serving a prison sentence”
aggravator can be vicariously applied, then B is rendered death-eligible by
virtue of A’s current incarceration.122
2. The Status of the Victim
Most capital-sentencing statutes provide for one or more aggravating
factors based on the victim’s status—that is, some attendant circumstance
relating to the status of the victim determines the severity of the crime.
Common examples include killing a “peace officer,” “firefighter,” “judge,”
or “elected . . . official.”123 Alternatively, the defendant may face a
sentence of death when he kills a particularly vulnerable victim, such as a
youthful,124 elderly,125 pregnant,126 or disabled victim.127 Interestingly,
there is once again a material distinction in the way these vulnerable-victim
statutes are worded. A Wyoming aggravator relating to age, for example,
provides that the aggravator exists if the “[t]he defendant knew or
120. Either by case law or statutory text, incarceration includes actual incarceration as well as
parole. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(F)(7)(a) (defendant committed the offense while
“[i]n the custody of or on authorized or unauthorized release from the state department of
corrections, a law enforcement agency or a county or city jail . . . [or] [o]n probation for a felony
offense”).
121. Id.
122. Similar reasoning could apply to aggravating factors that apply when the possession of the
murder weapon is a felony. If A has a prior conviction and thus the possession of a gun is a felony,
the question is whether B, as A’s accomplice to murder, is vicariously liable for the felon-inpossession aggravator.
123. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(c) (2012).
124. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3b(4)(k) (West 2012) (“The victim was less than 14
years old.”).
125. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(ix) (2012).
126. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(17) (2012).
127. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(14) (2012).
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reasonably should have known the victim was . . . older than sixtyfive . . . years of age.”128 Obviously, the defendant must be guilty of firstdegree murder in order to be death-eligible. If he is guilty of first-degree
murder, then this vulnerable-victim aggravator appears to apply regardless
of whether he was the actual killer. By contrast, a Colorado aggravating
factor applies only if the “defendant intentionally killed a child who has
not yet attained twelve years of age.”129 Under Colorado law, this factor
requires not only that the defendant himself be the killer, but that he have
some mens rea with regard to the victim’s status. A defendant who kills
intentionally but is unaware or even reckless with regard to the child’s age
cannot satisfy this statute in Colorado; similarly, a defendant who intends
that a child die and helps another to kill a child may not be death-eligible
because he is not himself the child’s killer.
C. Summary
In this brief and admittedly inexhaustive survey of common
aggravating factors, this Article’s goal has been to demonstrate that from
the non-killer’s perspective much depends on the precise nature of the
legislature’s wording. By their terms, some of these factors can be applied
only to killers, some can be applied to anyone guilty of a murder, and
others are ambiguous. Similarly, some aggravating factors require mens
rea, while others appear to countenance strict liability. This patchwork of
statutes should not be overly surprising, given the multiplicity of deathpenalty states and the fact that capital statutes—and particularly
aggravating factors—are often quickly, haphazardly, and serially drafted.
This variation in the wording and apparent meaning of aggravating factors
does raise important questions, however, about whether there are
constitutional limits on the capacity of a state legislature to apply these
factors against non-killers. After examining the doctrines of vicarious
liability in more detail, this Article will synthesize its various
components—the Eighth Amendment’s limits on the imposition of the
death penalty, the use of aggravating factors to do this work, and the
doctrines of vicarious liability—to suggest important limits on the
vicarious application of aggravating factors.
III. DOCTRINES OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Setting aside for a moment the question of death-eligibility, criminal
law recognizes several different theories of vicarious liability. That is, as a
matter of substantive criminal law, there are various theories under which
128. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(ix) (2012).
129. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(m) (2012). If A holds the victim while B shoots him,
is A (as an accomplice to murder) eligible for death based on the youthfulness aggravator? Should
it matter that A didn’t know it was a child but B did? Similar problems arise for aggravating factors
relating to the victim’s status as a government officer or a pregnant woman.
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criminal culpability for murder—or any other crime—may be attributed to
a defendant who did not commit the prohibited acts herself. Long
controversial, these doctrines take on an added level of controversy when
they lead to a conviction for capital murder.
A. Accomplice Liability
Perhaps the best known of the vicarious-liability doctrines is the
concept of accomplice liability. Accomplice liability is an ancient idea:
those who intentionally assist others in the commission of a crime are
liable for that crime as accomplices.130 The common law had various terms
to describe those who were involved in the commission of an offense—
principal, principal in the second degree, accomplice, accessory, accessory
after the fact, and so on.131 Modern criminal law, by contrast, has greatly
simplified accomplice law. It holds liable both those who in fact commit
crimes (principals) and those who aid and intend to aid the commission of
the offense (accomplices).132 The accomplice is generally deemed to be
guilty of the principal’s crime as if she had done it herself—that is, we say
that she is guilty of the principal’s crime as an accomplice.133 While her
diminished role in the commission of the offense may be considered at
sentencing, as a general matter accomplices share the guilt of those they
abet.134 What is more, the common law requirement that the principal be
convicted before an accomplice can be convicted of the offense has largely
been abrogated;135 in fact, there exist today situations in which an
130. See, e.g., Audrey Rogers, Accomplice Liability for Unintentional Crimes: Remaining
Within the Constraints of Intent, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1351, 1353–54 (1998) (“From the earliest
days of civilized society, aiding someone in the commission of a criminal act with the intent that a
crime be committed has been deemed blameworthy and deserving of punishment.”).
131. SANFORD H. KADISH, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 589–90 (8th ed. 2007).
132. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (Proposed Official Draft May 4, 1962).
133. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 6, at 433. It is not even necessary in many jurisdictions to
identify who is the accomplice and who is the principal. See, e.g., 15 Colo. Prac., Criminal Practice
& Procedure § 18.43 (“The complicitor and the principal need not be charged as codefendants in a
single proceeding, but if they are, it is not necessary to designate which is the principal and which is
the complicitor. In fact, a person can be charged as a principal and be convicted as a complicitor, or
vice versa.”).
134. Cf. Joshua Dressler, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 108-09 (1985) (“Neither modern nor ancient
treatises adequately explain why accomplices are punished for crimes they did not perpetrate, or
why their punishment may be as severe as that given to perpetrators. Although common moral
intuition dictates that all willing participants in crime should be punished, it would require a leap of
faith to derive from that intuition the thesis that all accomplices and perpetrators should be treated
alike. Considering the importance of the concepts of personal liability and causation in criminal
law, it is remarkable how little has been written on the theoretical basis of modern accomplice
liability and punishment.”)
135. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 52 P.3d 648, 655 (2002) (“If a shooter’s conviction is required
to impose vicarious liability on an aider and abettor, this restriction may unduly thwart the
prosecution of defendants involved in gang-related shootings. For instance, if the actual shooter
were also killed during an exchange of gunfire (therefore making a conviction impossible), the aider
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accomplice can be convicted even if the principal has a defense that
precludes her conviction entirely.136
Although the acceptance of accomplice liability is universal in the
English-speaking world,137 its theoretical underpinnings remain relatively
unexamined.138 Agency theory—the idea that the acts of an individual’s
agents are attributable back to the individual—only goes so far in
explaining the doctrine. As Professor Joshua Dressler has noted, the
principal is not truly the accomplice’s agent.139 For example, it is possible
to be an accomplice of a principal who is unaware that he has received the
accomplice’s aid; by contrast, agency law requires that the agent accept the
principal’s direction.140 Similarly, a harm-based approach cannot justify
holding the accomplice liable for the crimes of the principal; accomplice
liability does not rely on causation141 and could not reasonably do so. That
and abettor would escape liability . . . notwithstanding undisputed evidence that someone
intentionally and personally discharged a firearm proximately causing death.”); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.06(7) (Proposed Official Draft May 4, 1962) (“An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the
commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have
committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different
offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been
acquitted.”); Lance R. Chism, Comment, Criminal Law—State v. Carson: A Misguided Attempt to
Retain the Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine of Accomplice Liability Under the
Current Tennessee Code, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 273, 275 (1998) (“The most significant limitation to
convicting an accessory at common law was that the conviction of the principal was an ‘absolute
prerequisite.’ . . . Today, almost all states . . . allow an accomplice to be convicted even if the
principal has not been prosecuted or convicted, and also allow conviction of the accomplice if the
principal has been acquitted or has been convicted of a different offense.”).
136. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation,
73 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 327–28 (1985) (“A difficult question is what the legal status of the actions of
the principal must be for the accomplice to incur liability. The obvious suggestion that the principal
must be liable is shown to be incorrect by cases where the principal has a defense based upon
policies extrinsic to his guilt (such as diplomatic immunity or entrapment), or where the
principal’s behavior is excused. The guilt of the principal would suffice to ground the liability of
the accomplice where the principal has a [policy-based] defense (extrinsic to his guilt) but will not
suffice where the principal is excused.”).
137. See Dressler, supra note 5, at 91–92 (“The law of accomplice liability is perhaps now so
widely accepted that few scholars have examined the soundness of its theoretical foundations.”
(footnote omitted)).
138. Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 222 (2000)
(“Since the advent of the [MPC], accomplice liability has received relatively scant attention.”);
Michael D. Heyman, The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine: A Case Study in Failed
Law Reform, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 388, 389 (2010) (“Accomplice accountability is one of the
most difficult topics to deal with properly, either pedagogically or through scholarly analysis. When
people are part of multi-crime enterprises, it seems counterintuitive both for someone to be liable
for the conduct of another and for her not to be.”).
139. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 5, at 110 (“Civil rules of agency, however, cannot explain
precisely the doctrines of [criminal-law] accountability. Civil agency requires a party to consent to
being subjected to the control of another, whereas criminal liability does not.” (footnotes omitted)).
140. Id.
141. State v. Tally, 15 So. 722, 738 (1894) (“The assistance given, however, need not
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is, short of a finding that an accomplice has compelled the principal to
act—and duress is a very difficult case to make—it would be extremely
difficult to demonstrate that the encouragement of the accomplice caused
the principal to act.142 Thus, an accomplice may be convicted for the
principal’s conduct even in those situations in which it is clear that the
principal would have committed her crimes even without the aid and
encouragement of the accomplice. The MPC has embodied this approach,
holding a defendant liable not just for those crimes of the principal that she
has aided and intended to aid, but also crimes that she intended to aid and
attempted to aid.143
The justification for accomplice liability, then, must lie in the
manifestly antisocial behavior of the accomplice. That is, it must be based
on the theory that one who encourages others to commit crimes and intends
that those crimes be committed has demonstrated the same danger to
society that the principal has in doing those crimes herself. Of course, to
say that the behavior of the accomplice is antisocial and deserving of
society’s condemnation is not the same as saying that that antisocial
behavior is identical to that of the principal. Nonetheless, every American
jurisdiction would treat the accomplice as guilty of the same offense as the
principal; only by persuading the sentencer that the defendant–accomplice
was materially less culpable does the criminal law allow the secondary
actor to obtain a less severe sentence.144
B. Coconspirator Liability
At its core, a conspiracy is a relatively simple idea—the crime is
committed when two or more people agree to commit a crime or crimes
and then any one of them takes an overt act in furtherance of the
agreement.145 Conspiracy is a felony, punishable as such and often carrying
contribute to the criminal result in the sense that but for it the result would not have ensued.”);
Dressler, supra note 137, at 99 (“Unlike the person who commits the crime, the accomplice need
not be causally tied to the harm for which she is punished.”).
142. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 136, at 327 (“Complicity emerges as a separate ground of
liability because causation doctrine cannot in general satisfactorily deal with results that take the
form of another’s voluntary action.”). A defendant who uses an innocent agent to commit a crime—
one who has no mens rea regarding the offense—is culpable not as an accomplice but as a
principal. For example, where a defendant gets a “mule” to carry drugs across a border completely
without the mule’s awareness, the defendant is liable for the smuggling as a principal and the
innocent mule is not liable at all. Id. at 342 (“Since the acts of the primary party are excused and
hence not fully volitional, they can be treated as caused by the actions of the secondary party.”).
143. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (Proposed Official Draft May 4, 1962) (“A
person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of the offense if: with the purpose of
promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he . . . aids or agrees or attempts to aid
such other person in planning or committing it . . . .” (emphasis added)).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Ambrose, 740 F.2d 505, 508–09 (7th Cir. 1984).
145. In some cases, particularly for more serious crimes, the overt-act requirement may be
done away with. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(5) (“No person may be convicted of
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with it punishments that vary with the seriousness of the crime agreed to by
the parties.146 Thus, for instance, conspiracy to commit murder is a felony,
perhaps less serious than commission of the murder itself, but more serious
than, say, conspiracy to commit bank robbery.147 Again, the MPC takes a
relatively extreme position with regard to vicarious liability. Under the
Code, conspiracy to commit a crime is itself a crime, and is generally
punishable at the same grade of seriousness as the target offense itself.
That is, under the Code, a conspiracy to commit a robbery is an offense of
equal seriousness as the robbery itself.148
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, conspiracy is also a theory
of vicarious liability. The members of a conspiracy are generally
responsible for the crimes committed by other members of the conspiracy
if they are committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and are reasonably
foreseeable.149 This is true regardless of whether the crimes committed
were those agreed to as part of the conspiracy.150 Thus, where several
people plan a bank robbery and thereafter one of the people robs the bank
and kills a guard in the process, the other people are liable for the
substantive offense of conspiracy to commit bank robbery; bank robbery
(under a coconspirator theory); and murder (under a coconspirator theory),
assuming that the killing was reasonably foreseeable.
Thus, one can see that coconspirator liability is significantly broader
than accomplice liability in those states that have adopted both theories of
liability.151 This broadening of liability occurs in two ways. First, a
conspiracy to commit a crime, other than a felony of the first or second degree, unless an overt act
in pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by him or by a person with
whom he conspired.” (emphasis added)).
146. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003(D) (2012) (“Conspiracy to commit a class 1
felony is punishable by a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release on any basis
until the service of twenty-five years, otherwise, conspiracy is an offense of the same class as the
most serious offense which is the object of or result of the conspiracy.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 182
(West 2012) (setting forth the punishments for conspiracies to commit various categories of crimes).
147. See supra note 146.
148. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (Proposed Official Draft May 4, 1962) (“Except
as otherwise provided in this Section, attempt, solicitation and conspiracy are crimes of the same
grade and degree as the most serious offense that is attempted or solicited or is an object of the
conspiracy. An attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit a [capital crime or a] felony of the first
degree is a felony of the second degree.” (brackets in original)).
149. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1946).
150. United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 851 (11th Cir. 1985) (“We find the individual
culpability of [the defendants] sufficient to support their murder convictions under Pinkerton,
despite the fact that the murder was not within the originally intended scope of the conspiracy. In
addition, based on the same evidence, we conclude that the relationship between the three
appellants and the murder was not so attenuated as to run afoul of the potential due process
limitations on the Pinkerton doctrine.”). But see Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal Liability and the
Constitutional Dimension of Pinkerton, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 585 (2008) (arguing that the two-part
test associated with the Pinkerton decision was never designed by the Court to function as such).
151. Note that the MPC has rejected vicarious liability based on participation in a conspiracy;
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coconspirator is liable for the crimes of another regardless whether she has
actually facilitated the criminal acts of the principal. Imagine, for example,
two car thieves, each of whom agrees with a third party to participate in a
ring of auto thefts. The two thieves are aware of each other’s existence and
the fact that they are part of a larger agreement with common goals, but
they do not meet or in any other way interact. Under an accomplice theory,
the thieves could not be held liable for each other’s crimes; it would be
difficult to show either that they assisted one another or that they had the
intent to do so. Under a theory of coconspirator liability, by contrast, guilt
would be relatively easy to prove. Each has entered an agreement with
others and has intended to do so. Because each is aware of the other’s
existence, the crimes that each commits are reasonably foreseeable to the
other and are in furtherance of the conspiracy’s goals.
Second, it should be seen that the coconspirator is liable even for
crimes that were not countenanced by the conspiracy itself. Thus, in the
conspiracy to commit bank robbery described above, the coconspirators
would be liable for the unplanned, un-agreed-to killing of the security
guard so long as that killing was both in furtherance of the conspiracy’s
goal (bank robbery) and reasonably foreseeable. Although none of the
defendants could be charged with conspiracy to commit murder—because
that is not what any of them agreed to—any conspirator could be charged
with murder on a coconspirator theory. Unlike with accomplice liability,
where the accomplice’s guilt is determined by those crimes he both
encouraged and intended to encourage, with coconspirator liability the
relevant question is one of foreseeability. This is obviously a great
expansion of the scope of accessorial liability.
This expanded accountability afforded by coconspirator liability
appears to be grounded in the particular dangers associated with group
criminality.152 A defendant acting on his own can do only so much harm.
When he combines with others for the same purpose, though, the dangers
he poses can be multiplied many times over. Criminal agreements also
have the effect of emboldening criminal action—the criminal who has
agreed with others to commit crimes is more likely to actually commit
those crimes than the criminal merely musing over possible criminal

in these situations, the Code would make a defendant liable only where his participation in a
conspiracy makes him liable as an aider or abetter. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii)
(Proposed Official Draft May 4, 1962).
152. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Danger in Numbers: Why It Makes Sense to Have Harsh
Punishments for Conspiracy, LEGAL AFFAIRS, March/April 2003, at 44, 44 (“In a world full of crime
committed by groups, from terrorists to bank robbers to drug gangs to mafia families, traditional
conspiracy doctrine plays a vital role in making our society and communities safer. The doctrine
deters some people from joining criminal enterprises in the first place. And when conspiracies are
hatched, the law gives prosecutors leverage to ‘flip’ defendants and build cases out of their
testimony.”).
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conduct.153
C. The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine
The apex of vicarious liability is a species of accomplice liability
known as the natural and probable consequences (NPC) doctrine. Under
the NPC doctrine, a defendant is liable not just for those crimes that she
has aided and abetted but for all crimes that are the natural and probable
consequences of the crimes in fact aided and abetted.154 Here,
foreseeability is the only restraint on the defendant’s culpability. Once he
has become an accomplice, a defendant is liable for any crime that follows
predictably from the crime he aided and abetted. While courts have split on
the wisdom of the NPC doctrine, those jurisdictions that have accepted it
allow for criminal liability even in circumstances where there would not be
coconspirator liability.
D. The Felony Murder Rule
Although not strictly a theory of vicarious liability, felony murder plays
an important part in modern death-penalty jurisprudence.155 The rule, in its
simplest form, is that any death that occurs in the course of an enumerated
felony is murder regardless of the defendant’s individual culpability with
regard to death.156 Accordingly, the most direct effect of the felony murder
153. What is more, the agency theory that seemed misplaced in the accomplice-liability context
makes more theoretical sense here. By its very nature, a conspiracy is a bilateral (or multilateral)
agreement. Each of the parties has joined into an agreement because they expect and hope that they
will be benefitted thereby. It seems only fair in that context to hold the defendant responsible for the
foreseeable consequences of the plan that he has made himself a part of.
154. See, e.g., People v. Luparello, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832, 846 (1986).
155. The doctrine also has some outspoken and thoughtful defenders. See, e.g., Guyora Binder,
Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. REV. 403 (2011) (examining the features of the
felony murder doctrine that make it a palatable, even desirable, part of America’s criminal law).
156. See GUYORA BINDER, FELONY MURDER (2012) 97–98:
Contemporary commentators continue to instruct lawyers and law students
that England bequeathed America a sweeping default principle of strict liability for
all deaths caused in all felonies. According to Wayne LaFave’s treatise, “[a]t one
time the English common law felony-murder rule was that one who, in the
commission or attempted commission of a felony, cause another’s death, was
guilty of murder, without regard to the dangerous nature of the felony involved or
the likelihood that death might result from the defendant’s manner of committing
or attempting the felony.” Similarly the American Law Institute’s Model Penal
Code commentary describes “the common-law felony-murder doctrine” as
declaring “that one is guilty of murder if death results from conduct during the
commission or attempted commission of any felony. . . . As thus conceived, the
rule operated to impose liability for murder based on . . . strict liability.”
According to Joshua Dressler’s textbook, “At common law, a person is guilty of
murder if she kills another person during the commission or attempted
commission of any felony. This . . . felony-murder rule applies whether a felon
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rule is to permit a murder conviction for a principal who lacked the mens
rea necessary for a murder conviction.157 Considering again the robbery
situation above as an example, imagine the bank guard is killed
accidentally in the course of the principal’s robbing of the bank. The death
could be charged as murder, even if the principal was neither reckless nor
even negligent in bringing about the guard’s death. This much-criticized158
prosecutorial shortcut thus makes it much easier to prove a murder case
against the principal than if the government were required to show that the
defendant was extremely reckless with regard to death.
But felony murder does more than simply make the principal
responsible for a murder for which he might otherwise lack mens rea.
Combined with other doctrines of vicarious liability, it makes the other
participants in a felony equally guilty for an unintended killing committed
by another. Thus, not only is the robber who accidentally killed in the
course of his crime a murderer under a felony murder theory, but the
accomplice who gave him the gun (and who is liable for the robbery under
an accomplice theory) is now responsible for a crime he neither intended
nor committed. Felony murder, then, is something like a vicarious liability
theory on top of a vicarious liability theory. While the Enmund and Tison
decisions ameliorate some of the worst consequences of this doctrine—by
making those guilty of felony murder simpliciter ineligible for the death
penalty—the fact remains that in many instances a non-killer who lacks a
highly culpable mens rea with regard to death can be found guilty of
kills the victim intentionally, recklessly, negligently, or accidentally and
unforeseeably.” Arnold Loewy’s Criminal Law in a Nutshell informs students that
“[a]t early common law, felony murder was a simple proposition: any death
resulting from an apparently non-dangerous felony would be murder.” (footnotes
omitted).
Note that Binder is skeptical of this reading:
[N]one of these accounts identifies when this supposed common law rule of
strict liability for all deaths resulting from felonies became the law in England.
None identifies a single case in which it was applied in England before American
independence. These accounts are hazy about early American law. None of them
documents application of such a rule in colonial America, or in the early American
republic. In short, there is something suspicious about our received account of the
origins of American felony murder rules.”
Id. at 98 (footnotes omitted).
157. There is a tension between the death penalty, which tends to require heightened
procedures and culpability, and felony murder, which “in its starkest form, provides that any
participant in a specified felony that results in death shall be punished as a murderer . . . .” See
Rosen, supra note 10, at 1104–05.
158. See, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the
Forces That Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1441 (1994) (noting that the
rule is inconsistent with basic requirements of culpability).
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murder, and perhaps even capital murder.159
IV. PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: PROPORTIONALITY AND VICARIOUS
AGGRAVATORS
A. Alternative Approaches to Vicarious-Aggravator Liability
For current purposes, this Article takes certain Supreme Court
doctrines as fact. For example, this Article presumes that the death penalty
can be constitutionally imposed given a statutory scheme that genuinely
narrows the pool of death-eligible murderers. Further, this Article
presumes that a defendant can be criminally prosecuted for the conduct of
another under a theory of accomplice or coconspirator liability. Finally,
this Article takes as a given the Court’s decisions in Tison and Enmund,
which make some non-killers eligible for death. The specific question
addressed here is whether a defendant who did not himself kill can be
made eligible for death through vicarious aggravating-factor liability.160 In
other words, can an aggravating factor be imputed to a defendant based on
the actions or status of his codefendant? This is a question the Supreme
Court itself has not yet addressed and that has proven enigmatic for the few
lower courts that have even obliquely addressed the subject.161
There are three conceivable approaches to vicarious-aggravator
liability. First, a court could conclude that any imputation of aggravating
factors from one defendant to another is strictly prohibited. This position is
the equivalent of a holding that the Eighth Amendment requires each
individual to have personal responsibility for any aggravating factor
alleged against him. Alternatively, one could argue that any aggravating
159. The majority of states, as a statutory matter, prohibit the death penalty for felony murder
accomplices unless the defendant intended to kill. See Trigilio & Casadio, supra note 10, at 1401.
160. Analogously, this Article is interested in whether a killer who is not otherwise guilty of
capital murder can be sentenced to death based on vicarious liability for the aggravating factors of
an accomplice. The question, more generally, is whether aggravating factors may ever be applied
across defendants.
161. Colorado’s state high court is emblematic. In the one opinion on the subject, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the United State Supreme Court’s Enmund opinion forbade the giving of a
complicity instruction at sentencing. See People v. Borrego, 774 P.2d 854, 857 (1989). Because
Enmund stands for the proposition that the focus at sentencing should be on each individual’s moral
culpability, the Court reasoned, “[i]t is therefore impermissible under the eighth amendment to treat
in the same manner two defendants facing a sentence of death so that the jury could attribute to one
the culpability of the other. Since complicity is a theory that necessitates holding one person legally
accountable for the behavior of another, a defendant’s constitutional rights are violated if the jury in
a [capital] sentencing hearing is given a complicity instruction.” Id. (citations omitted). This is true
so far as it goes, but it probably overstates the constitutional mandate. It is true that the focus at
sentencing must be on the individual being sentenced and that a general complicity instruction at
sentencing would invite the jury to impute the principal’s death worthiness to the accomplice. By
contrast, if the court explains to the jury under what circumstances a particular aggravating factor
may be found with regard to a non-killing defendant, this Article submits that the Eighth
Amendment is satisfied.
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factor that is applicable under a doctrine of vicarious liability ought to
apply vicariously to each defendant. In other words, if an aggravating
factor is directly applicable to a principal, and other defendants are
responsible for the principal’s behavior under a theory of vicarious
liability, then that aggravating factor should be imputed against each
defendant. As explained more fully below, this Article submits that a third,
middle-of-the-road position most closely approximates the Court’s current
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Before elaborating on this Article’s
theory of vicarious liability, it is worth considering what vicariousaggravator liability would look like under the two extreme models that this
Article rejects.
Consider first the view that there can be no vicarious-aggravator
liability. Such a system would preclude death sentences for nearly all nonkillers. One state supreme court has come close to embracing this position,
explaining that “a defendant’s constitutional rights are violated if the jury
in a [capital] sentencing hearing is given a complicity instruction” as to an
aggravating factor.162 While this holding certainly demonstrates concern
about vicarious aggravating-factor liability, it is probably overreading it to
conclude that an aggravating factor can never apply to a non-killer. That is
to say, some aggravating factors may apply based on the plain text of the
statute, and a defendant who has personally satisfied the requirements of
the aggravator may be death-eligible. For instance, vicarious-aggravator
liability hardly seems necessary to apply certain victim-specific
aggravators to a non-killer. For example, imagine an aggravating factor
that makes a defendant death-eligible if the victim of a murder is under the
age of twelve. An aggravating factor like this—which describes a fact
about the world that is either true or false—would seem to apply equally to
killers and non-killers alike.
A more extreme limitation on the death penalty would recognize the
inapplicability of any aggravating factors to non-killers. That is to say, the
most robust limitation on vicarious-aggravator liability would be an
understanding that only the killer himself can be made death-eligible
through the use of aggravating factors. Such a view, while laudably
protective of the Eighth Amendment interest in limiting the death penalty
to the very most culpable offenders, is necessarily in tension with the
holdings of both Enmund and Tison, which recognized the possibility that a
non-killer can be sentenced to death consistent with the Eighth
Amendment.163 In Tison , for example, two of the aggravating factors that
rendered the defendant eligible for death—committing a killing for
pecuniary gain, and killing in a cruel and heinous manner164—were not
162. Id.
163. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
164. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 141–42 (1987) (citing the applicable version of the
Arizona capital-sentencing statute). In addition, although the death sentence in Enmund was struck
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directly applicable to Tison because he was not the actual killer. In other
words, the Court implicitly endorsed at least some level of vicarious
aggravating-factor liability in Tison. Accordingly, a reading of the capital
sentencing statutes that precludes any vicarious aggravator liability is
necessarily a narrowing of the death penalty beyond what the Court itself
has sanctioned.165
At the other extreme is the concept of a full applicability of aggravating
factors to non-killers. Some examples of broad application of aggravating
factors are entirely palatable. For example, an eligibility factor that asks the
sentencer to consider the future dangerousness of the defendant would, it
seems, be as logically applicable to a non-killer as to the killer himself.
Insofar as future dangerousness is an individualized assessment of the
future threat he poses to society, it is relevant to the appropriate
punishment in a given case, and there is good reason to apply this
aggravating factor to a non-killer. Just as with true accomplice liability,
which requires culpability on the part of the principal, the critical question
is whether the defendant himself poses the level of dangerousness that
makes him eligible for death.
However, other examples of the absolute approach to aggravator
liability test the strictures of the Eight Amendment. In particular, once
aggravating factors are applied vicariously to non-killers, the fit between
the aggravating factor and the individual culpability of a non-killer
becomes attenuated. For example, under the absolute view, if one is a
coconspirator, then he can fairly be charged with any of the aggravating
factors that followed from the conspiratorial plan and that were reasonably
foreseeable. For example, if an aggravating factor specifies that the
defendant killed someone for pecuniary gain, the application of that factor
to one who killed for profit meaningfully impacts his culpability.
Application to a non-killing coconspirator would be significantly more
problematic, though. On these facts, the pecuniary-gain aggravator would
apply to the codefendant only through a theory of accomplice or
coconspirator liability.166 That is, although the text of the aggravator
appears to countenance only application to those who kill, it could be
argued that because a codefendant is responsible for the killing—as an
accomplice or coconspirator—she is responsible for any relevant
down as disproportionate, the Court did not object to the State’s application of four aggravating
factors to Enmund even though he was not the actual killer. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 785
(“[T]he capital felony was committed while Enmund was engaged in or was an accomplice in the
commission of an armed robbery; the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain; it was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and Enmund was previously convicted of a felony involving
the use or threat of violence.” (citations omitted)).
165. Tison, 481 U.S. at 141–42.
166. The pecuniary-gain aggravating factor was applied to codefendant non-killers in both the
Enmund and Tison cases. Tison, 481 U.S. at 142; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 785.
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aggravators as well.167
While this argument has some rationale to it, its application is deeply
problematic. For example, consider a non-killer codefendant who assists in
the killing of a juror or witness without knowing that the person the
principal intends to kill is a juror or witness. Under a broad theory of
vicarious aggravating-factor liability, the non-killer would be guilty of
murder and could be charged with the witness-or-juror-killing aggravator.
Even more extreme, if the killer has a prior violent felony (and the
accomplice does not), under a theory of vicarious aggravating-factor
liability, the non-killer could be charged with the prior-violent-felony
aggravator since that factor is true with regard to the principal. Holding an
accomplice liable for the aggravating factors that are unrelated to and even
unknown to the accomplice would seem to undermine the very purpose
aggravating factors are designed to play in the capital sentencing process—
designating an individual as the worst of the worst. If the factor that
qualifies a defendant for death has no relation to the defendant’s own
culpability, then the constitutionally assigned purpose of aggravating
factors is simply not being served. The automatic and unthinking
application of an aggravating factor to an accomplice or coconspirator thus
violates the narrowing requirements of the Eighth Amendment.
B. The Eighth Amendment Solution to Vicarious-Aggravator Liability
Because neither of these two extremes—no vicarious liability or total
vicarious liability—reflects the Eighth Amendment mandate of
individualized culpability assessments in capital sentencing, a novel
alternative is needed. This Article proposes a straightforward, doctrinally
grounded, four-part framework for resolving the question of vicariousaggravator liability.
Borrowing from the Georgia Supreme Court’s Zant metaphor, this
Article submits that the proper sentencing procedure can be thought of as a
pyramid where only those defendants at the top of the pyramid can be
sentenced to death on the basis of vicarious-aggravator liability.168 The
pyramid consists of the following four tiers, each of which must be
satisfied in order for a death sentence to be statutorily and constitutionally
sound as to a non-killer: (1) the defendant must be guilty of first-degree
167. After all, the entire vicarious-liability framework is predicated on this fictional notion that
the defendant herself did something that she in fact did not. See Dressler, supra note 6, at 433
(“[A]s an accomplice to murder she will be convicted of the offense of ‘killing’ another person
when, in fact, she did not kill the victim; as an accomplice to a rape, she will be convicted of having
sexual intercourse with one whom she did not (and perhaps could not) have had sexual relations; as
an accomplice to burglary she will be convicted of breaking and entering a structure she may never
have seen, much less broken or entered.”).
168. This Article, of course, borrows the image of the pyramid from the Georgia Supreme
Court’s description of its capital-sentencing system. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 870–71
(1983).
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murder; (2) the death penalty must be proportionate to the crime (and the
defendant’s status); (3) the plain language of the capital-sentencing statute
must permit the application of the aggravating factor to a non-killer; and
(4) the defendant must have been at least reckless as to the aggravating
factor’s existence. This Section elaborates on each of these four tiers in
turn.
The starting point for an analysis of the death-eligibility of a non-killer
is, of course, the question of murder liability. If the defendant is not guilty
of first-degree murder, then he cannot be sentenced to death. As discussed
previously, there are a variety of doctrines that allow a defendant to derive
liability from the conduct of his cohorts, and thus first-degree murder
liability for a non-killer is not only possible, but common. The defendant
need not be the actual killer, or the one who committed the offense, but he
must be guilty of first-degree murder under one of the doctrines of
vicarious liability.
Second, even for a defendant guilty of first-degree murder, there can be
no death sentence unless the substantive proportionality principle of the
Eighth Amendment is satisfied. If the defendant is a juvenile, or he is
mentally retarded, for example, then the death penalty is impermissible.
Likewise, if the defendant is not a sufficiently major participant and he was
not at least reckless as to the death of the victim, then a sentence of death is
unconstitutionally disproportionate.
Third, and perhaps most critically, is the requirement that the plain text
of the aggravating factor permit vicarious liability. At this stage courts
should defer entirely to the legislative will; courts ought not to consider the
wisdom and overbreadth of the application of the aggravator to a nonkiller. In short, the question is purely one of legislative intent—that is, did
the legislature intend for the aggravator in question to apply to a non-killer
so as to render him eligible for the ultimate punishment. As is the case in
other areas of law, the statutory text will not always be susceptible to a
single, unequivocal meaning as to the extent of its vicarious applicability.
Notably, this Article has identified at least four models of statutory
language, the varying meanings of which determine whether vicariousaggravator liability might be permitted as a matter of statutory
construction.
In order to illustrate the four models of statutory language that are
relevant to this question, it is useful to consider one of the aggravating
factors that the prosecution relied on to seek the death penalty for Ricky
and Raymond Tison. Recall that the Tisons were in the process of stealing
a car to assist with a prison break when the eldest Tison shot and killed the
family who was travelling in the car they sought to steal. Ricky Tison—
who was part of the jailbreak and robbery but did not commit the
murders—was convicted of felony murder, and the prosecution sought the
death penalty against him based on, among other aggravators, the
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pecuniary-gain aggravating factor.169 Consider four variations on the
pecuniary-gain aggravating factor and the implications of each for the
vicarious application of that factor:
(i) The defendant intentionally killed another person for
pecuniary gain.
(ii) The defendant committed the offense for pecuniary
gain.170
(iii) The defendant caused the death of another person for
pecuniary gain.
(iv) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
From (i) to (iv), the aggravators are, arguably, worded from least to
most amenable to vicarious application. Whether actual aggravators are
carefully crafted with such care or whether the varying wording is simply a
matter of chance, the plain text of the statutes must be given effect.
Accordingly, an aggravator like example (i) should almost certainly not be
read to permit vicarious liability. Where the aggravator is written so as to
apply only when the “defendant kills,” it is a stretch to argue that this
statute can be applied to a non-killer accomplice.171 In other words, we
ought to respect the legislature’s decision to limit aggravating-factor
culpability to individuals who actually kill.
Example (ii), by contrast, is less straightforward. On the one hand, the
phrase “committed the offense” in this statute seems synonymous with
“kill.” Thus, there is a strong argument that this aggravator, like (i), should
not be applied to a non-killer. On the other hand, the term “committed”
might better be deemed equivalent to “is guilty of,” in which case
application to a non-killer is appropriate. That is to say, one might read
aggravating factors that limit their reach to defendants who “committed the
offense” as permitting vicarious liability a long as the defendant is guilty of
the murder under a theory of vicarious liability.172 While in our view this
seems like a stretch, and although the issue has never been litigated in the
169. Tison, 481 U.S. at 142.
170. This is the text of the pecuniary-gain aggravator that was in effect at the time of the
Tisons’ prosecution. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-454(E) (1973) (“The defendant committed the
offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary
value.”).
171. A typical example would be an aggravating factor that applies when “[t]he defendant
intentionally killed a child . . . .” COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(m). It would seem a stretch to
say that the accomplice or coconspirator, who is guilty of murdering the child, actually killed the
child.
172. It is strange to understand an accomplice as having “committed” an offense insofar as the
defining feature of vicarious liability is holding one criminally responsible for a crime he did not
commit. Dressler, supra note 6, at 433.
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Supreme Court, it is worth noting that the pecuniary-gain aggravating
factor that the prosecution relied on in Tison was worded in precisely this
manner. Specifically, the relevant statute provided that the aggravating
factor was satisfied if the “defendant committed the offense . . . in
expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value.”173
Notwithstanding the statutory language appearing to limit liability to those
who “committed the offense,” the Supreme Court upheld the death
sentence based in part on the presence of this aggravating factor. A
sentence of death was thus affirmed even though the aggravating factor
was applied vicariously in a manner that appears inconsistent with the
plain text of the statute. In our view, this was inconsistent with the plain
language of the aggravating factor and, hence, error.
Even more complicated is example (iii). That aggravating factor applies
so long as the defendant caused death. Such statutes seem to evince the
intent of the legislature to render eligible for death those defendants who
did not actually kill or commit the offense but whose conduct foreseeably
led to the death. But the difficult question with such a theory is what the
State would have to prove in order to demonstrate that the defendant, as a
non-killer, was the cause of a victim’s death. Significantly, there is a body
of case law recognizing when defendants are the cause of death in such
circumstances.174 Specifically, where the defendant creates a grave risk of
death to others—that is, he manifests extreme malice to others—he may be
treated as a cause in fact of the victim’s death, even though he was not the
actual killer.175 Thus, when the aggravating factor specifies that there must
be causation, then a defendant can plausibly be charged with an
aggravating factor even if he did not himself commit the homicidal offense
or kill the victim.
Finally, example (iv) is the most straightforward example of vicariousaggravator applicability. In (iv), the aggravating factor is framed in terms
of certain events, certain attendant circumstances external to any particular
actor. For example, if the aggravating factor provides that the murder must
have been committed for pecuniary gain, then as long as this circumstance
exists the aggravator is satisfied with regard to all of those guilty of that
killing. Similarly, if the aggravating factor specifies that the victim was
under a certain age, or particularly vulnerable, or pregnant, then the
aggravating factor can, as a statutory matter, logically be extended to any
173. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-454(E) (1973). Notably, the Tisons were also rendered
eligible for the death penalty under a cruel or heinous aggravating factor that applied only if the
“defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.” Id. Given
that the Tison brothers did not kill anyone, had the parties litigated this issue, it seems that neither
of these statutory aggravating factors would have applied to a defendant who was a non-killer—that
is, a defendant who did not actually commit the offense.
174. See, e.g., People v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365, 373–74 (Cal. 1965).
175. See, e.g., id.
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non-killer. There is nothing in the text of such aggravating factors that
would preclude them from applying to a non-killer; indeed, the most
reasonable reading of those statutes would suggest a legislative intent to
apply the aggravator vicariously.176
Fourth, assuming the defendant is guilty of first-degree murder under a
theory of vicarious liability, assuming the death penalty is not
disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment, and assuming finally that
the plain text of the statute permits an aggravating factor to be applied to a
non-killer, then the final question in our analysis is whether there is a
constitutional problem with the vicarious application of that aggravator.
In our view, the rote application of aggravating factors vicariously
raises constitutional concerns unless there is a showing that the defendant
has personal culpability with regard to that factor. Under a conspiracy,
natural-and-probable-consequences, or felony murder theory of vicarious
liability, a non-killer could be guilty of first-degree murder even if he was
only negligent as to the resulting death.177 Moreover, the statute defining
the relevant aggravating factor may permit liability for a non-killer, and it
may even do so without specifying any additional mens rea.178 In our view,
however, more is needed before a defendant can be rendered eligible for
the death penalty. That is, even if the defendant can be guilty of murder
based on a lower standard of mens rea, the Eighth Amendment requires
that the defendant be at least reckless as to the aggravating factors relied
upon to make him eligible for death.179
Considering the constitutionally mandated function of aggravating
factors in ensuring that only the most culpable offenders are eligible for

176. One can imagine that if certain aggravating factors were worded so as to permit vicarious
liability, the narrowing function that aggravating factors are designed to serve would be
undermined. For example, if the conventional prior-conviction aggravator was phrased, “The killer
had previously been convicted of a violent felony,” then a non-killer would be treated as eligible for
a capital sentence based on a circumstance that had nothing to do with his own culpability.
177. These doctrines are sometimes described as theories of strict liability; however, given that
the death under each doctrine must be reasonably foreseeable, it seems more apt to equate them
with a culpability of criminal negligence.
178. Some aggravating factors specify a mens rea. For example, the aggravator might specify
that during “the commission of the offense, the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to
another person in addition to the victim . . . .” COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(i) (2012).
179. Commentators have noted that as to the question of felony murder liability, the Enmund–
Tison limitation functions such that death is only available for those who were at least reckless as to
the resulting death; this is a very feeble limitation. See Rosen, supra note 10, at 1158 (concluding
that reckless indifference to life is present in nearly every felony murder). However, with respect to
the sort of attendant circumstances present in many aggravating-factor statutes—such as age,
cruelty, etc.—the requirement of recklessness will likely prove to be a more meaningful
constitutional limitation. Whereas the “Tison standard rationally can be held to apply to every
felony murder accomplice,” id. at 1162, the same is not true for a recklessness requirement as to
every material element specified in an aggravating factor.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/3

42

Kamin and Marceau: Vicarious Aggravators

2013]

VICARIOUS AGGRAVATORS

811

death sentences,180 individual culpability for each aggravating factor is
required. Specifically, where the aggravating factor does not itself specify a
mens rea, the defendant can only be charged with the aggravator when the
prosecution can prove to the jury that he was at least reckless as to the
material elements of the aggravating factor. Accordingly, even if the
aggravating factor specifies only that the victim was pregnant, or that the
victim was an elected official, the non-killer cannot be held strictly liable
for the aggravating factor. Even if strict aggravator liability may not be
unconstitutional as applied to the actual killer, strict vicarious liability is
simply too wide a net of death-eligibility when applied to the non-killer.181
Thus, if A provides the murder weapon and other assistance to B, but
has no idea that B’s intended victim is a minor, the narrowing function of
the aggravating factors would be undermined if the minor-victim
aggravator were imputed to A. On the other hand, because the Court has
previously sanctioned the use of recklessness as the measure of culpability
required to make death a proportionate punishment,182 we submit that the
same level of culpability should suffice to satisfy the individual culpability
requirements served by aggravating factors.183 Thus, B may still be found
liable of murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory. And he may still
satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality requirement if he was
reckless with regard to the death of B’s victim. But he cannot be put to
death unless it is also shown that he was also reckless with regard to the
age of the victim. That is, unless he was aware of a risk that B planned to
kill a minor and aided him despite this risk, he is not eligible for the
penalty of death.
In sum, vicarious-aggravator liability is constitutionally permissible, but
strict vicarious-aggravator liability is not. In order to determine whether a
non-killer may be sentenced to death, four distinct determinations should
be made. While the first two requirements—first-degree-murder guilt and
proportionality limits—are well-settled, our contribution is to emphasize
the latter two conditions. Specifically, it is important to realize that not all
aggravating factors are drafted in a way that permits, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, vicarious liability. Moreover, even those
aggravating factors that are textually amenable to vicarious liability would
fail to satisfy the narrowing function ascribed to aggravating factors in
Gregg if they were understood to impose strict vicarious liability.
180. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (asserting that the death penalty is
often applied arbitrarily).
181. Previous scholarship has recognized that the Court “conscripted the reckless indifference
doctrine” into the Eighth Amendment inquiry for accomplice liability. See State Death Sentence,
supra note 10, at 880–81 (internal quotation marks omitted) (criticizing the use of recklessness as
insufficient as a narrowing device).
182. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
183. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (Proposed Official Draft May 4, 1962).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

43

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 3

812

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

Accordingly, we propose a theory of vicarious-aggravator liability that
permits a defendant to be charged with an aggravating factor only if the
non-killer defendant is at least reckless as to the aggravating factor’s
material elements.
Obviously, if the aggravating factor specifies a higher level of
culpability—intention or knowledge—then that is the mens rea that must
be satisfied. When the aggravating factor is silent with regard to mens rea,
however, the Eighth Amendment’s twin concerns of proportionality and
narrowing are adequately safeguarded by requiring a culpability of at least
recklessness.
CONCLUSION
A person may be convicted of murder even though he was not the
actual killer; indeed, the doctrines of vicarious liability may permit such
convictions even when the accomplice’s culpability is comparatively small.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has not ruled out—and has in fact
endorsed—the possibility of some non-killers being sentenced to death.
However, as a procedural matter, the death-eligibility determination must
still be based on criteria that genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible
defendants. That is to say, even if the death penalty is not per se
unconstitutional as applied to non-killers, it is clear that the ultimate
punishment is only available if one or more of the aggravating factors
applies to the non-killer. This Article considers this collision between
vicarious liability and the narrowing function that aggravating factors are
constitutionally mandated to provide.
The Eighth Amendment’s proportionality doctrine limits the death
penalty to defendants who had a culpability of at least recklessness as to
the death of the victim. So too do the Eighth Amendment’s narrowing and
proportionality doctrines require that a defendant be at least reckless as to
the material elements of an aggravating factor in order to be eligible for a
sentence of death. In order for the Eighth Amendment requirement that
capital-sentencing systems sort out the worst of the worst to have any
practical application, it must require not just the codification of
aggravating factors, but also procedural rules for ensuring that non-killers
are sufficiently culpable so as to justify the ultimate punishment. We can
convict the defendant based on the bad luck that his coconspirator killed
someone, and we can make him constitutionally death-eligible because he
was reckless and deeply involved in the felony. But it is simply too much
to take the third step of saying this defendant is the worst of the worst
because his codefendant alone had culpability as to an aggravating factor.
Stated more directly, it defies any sense of proportionality and narrowing
to conclude that, based on the fact of involvement alone, regardless of the
statutory text, and regardless of individual culpability, a defendant is guilty
of not just murder, but capital murder.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/3

44

